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Preface 
The spring of 2013 marked the 10 year anniversary for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
The invasion is interesting because the United States accused Iraq, Iran, North Korea and 
Libya for being part of an Axis of Evil in 2002, while laying out a formal doctrine of 
prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. In March 2003 the United States applied the  
doctrine in Iraq, on the premise of Iraq’s alleged clandestine nuclear weapons 
programme. Interestingly enough, within the same year as Iraq was invaded, North Korea 
decided to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran 
decided to halt parts of its nuclear programme, while Libya decided to cancel its nuclear 
programme. In the decade that has passed since 2003, North Korea has conducted three 
nuclear tests; Libya has no longer a nuclear programme, but experienced an attack from a 
United States led coalition; and uncertainty revolves around the purpose of Iran’s nuclear  
programme.  
 
Being allowed to write this thesis not only for the University of Nordland, but also for the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has been a privilege. As FFI has 
provided me with an office, I have been situated close to many of Norway’s finest experts 
on the subjects of nuclear weapons programmes, and especially Iran’s and North Korea’s. 
I would firstly like to thank my great tutors Dr. Steinar Høibråten, Halvor Kippe, Hege 
Schultz Heireng, and Dr. Monica Endregard at FFI, for the close monitoring of this 
research. You have truly been an invaluable asset. Secondly I would like to thank 
Sébasien Miraglia and Michael Mayer at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
(IFS), and Sverre Lodgaard at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) for 
their time and input. Thirdly I would like to thank my great tutor from the University of 
Nordland, Elisabeth Pettersen for all her feedback. Fourthly I would like to thank family 
and friends who have supported me through the past year, keeping my spirit up. In love 
and gratitude, thank you all. 
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1 Introduction 
On 29 January 2002, United States President George W. Bush1 named the Republic of 
Iraq (hereinafter referred to as Iraq), the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to 
as Iran) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as North 
Korea) as members of “the Axis of Evil” (see Section 2.1) in his “State of the Union 
Address”. On 6 May 2002 the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(hereinafter referred to as Libya) was added to the list, in what Assistant Secretary for 
International Organization Affairs John Bolton referred to as “beyond the Axis of Evil”. 
One year later, on 20 March 2003, Iraq was invaded based on accusations of harbouring 
and supporting terrorists, as well as the suspicion that Saddam Hussein was secretly 
developing weapons of mass destruction (see Section 1.2). Interestingly enough, within 
the same year as the invasion took place, the other members of the Axis of Evil all 
changed behaviour regarding their respective nuclear programmes: North Korea 
withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (see 
Section 2.2) on 10 January 2003, two months before the invasion; Iran halted some of its 
nuclear activities during the fall of 2003; while Libya made an official announcement on 
19 December 2003, stating that it would dispose of all weapons of mass destruction and 
adhere to its commitments to the NPT (Arms Control Association 2013a).  
 
It may seem that Iran, North Korea and Libya feared the same fate as Iraq, and changed 
behaviour because of this. This research aims at investigating other possible factors that 
could explain what caused the changes in the nuclear programmes in 2003, in order to 
determine if the invasion of Iraq was the determining factor.  
1.1 Topic and Research Question 
The topic of this research is the nuclear programmes in Iran, North Korea and Libya, and 
how each state’s behaviour changed regarding their respective programmes. The research 
also concerns the ten years that have passed since the invasion of Iraq, and focuses on 
how the different nuclear programmes have turned out. Investigating and comparing the 
three nuclear programmes is interesting for many reasons: Firstly, Iran, North Korea and 
Libya chose different paths for their nuclear programmes: Iran may or may not be 
                                                          
1 George W. Bush, President of the United States 2001 to 2009 
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developing nuclear weapons; North Korea went all the way and acquired nuclear 
weapons; and Libya gave up its nuclear weapons ambitions in 2003. Secondly, all three 
states were labelled by the United States as “rogue states”2 being part of the Axis of Evil 
(see Section 2.1). Thirdly, all three states traded with the Pakistani nuclear scientist 
Abdul Qadeer Khan and his network (see Footnote 7), which provided nuclear 
technology. Fourthly, Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes have continued to 
draw attention for the past ten years, and uncertainty still revolves around both 
programmes.  
 
This research can be described as a dual investigation: Firstly, it investigates if the 
invasion of Iraq caused the noticeable change in the nuclear programmes of Iran, North 
Korea and Libya in 2003. Secondly, it investigates what other factors may have caused 
the nuclear programmes to turn out the way they did. As the title of this research is 
“Possible effects of the 2003 Iraq invasion on the nuclear programmes in Iran, North 
Korea and Libya”, it only suggests that the 2003 Iraq invasion might have affected these 
nuclear programmes. And so, the research question aims at addressing the duality 
mentioned above:  
 
To what degree did the 2003 invasion of Iraq affect Iran, North Korea and Libya to 
change behaviour regarding their nuclear programmes; and to what degree did the 2003 
invasion of Iraq affect the outcome of the three nuclear programmes?  
 
As an investigation, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 will be used as a timeline 
indicator to see if changes in behaviour regarding the respective nuclear programmes 
occurred before or after the invasion, and if these changes appear to have occurred as a 
direct effect of the invasion, or not. The invasion is interesting to use as an indicator, as 
Iraq was invaded based on accusations of the possession of weapons of mass destruction, 
and there is reason to believe that this may have caused Iran, North Korea and Libya to 
change their behaviour regarding their own nuclear programmes. With the invasion as an 
indicator, the timeline for this study need to start before 2003 and end after, in order to 
understand the outcome of the three different nuclear programmes. Therefore this 
research will focus on the period from 2000 to 2013, identifying the most important 
                                                          
2  ”rogue states” are labelled as such because of their (anti-Western) foreign policy outlook. Rogue states 
are viewed as directly threatening international order and stability (Rogue State 2013). 
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events that took place, which could have affected the outcomes. Nonetheless, this 
research acknowledges the fact that all three nuclear programmes, and their possible 
military dimensions, go further back in time than 2000, but the analysis focuses on the 
last 13 years as these are the most interesting in terms of the behavioural change. Still, 
this research will give a brief historical review of each state’s nuclear programme, as 
events prior to 2000 might have contributed to the outcomes. In order to analyse the 
rationale behind the changes, the research will also use the international relations theory 
realism as the theoretical framework, supported by liberalism and social constructivism in 
order to provide a better and more nuanced analysis.  
 
This research has the following view on the three programmes: Libya had a clandestine 
nuclear weapons programme, without any ambitions for nuclear power; North Korea 
focused mainly on nuclear weapons, but had also (and still has) ambitions for nuclear 
power; while Iran has reached far in the field of nuclear power – with the Middle East’s 
first nuclear power plant – and the development of fuel cycle technology, but also seems 
to have explored a nuclear weapons option, at least until late 2003. As a result, the 
analysis of Libya in this research will necessarily be shorter than the analysis of Iran and 
North Korea, given the shorter time frame in which Libya’s nuclear programme existed. 
1.2 Definitions 
The topic and the research question require the use of certain terms and definitions in 
order to provide context and to define key principles that is important throughout this 
research:  
 
• Nuclear programme: National programme to develop methods and technologies 
for peaceful or military use of nuclear energy. 
 
• Nuclear-weapon state (NWS): According to the NPT, states which carried out a 
nuclear detonation before 1967 have a temporary right to possess such weapons. 
This right includes China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, which are designated nuclear-weapon states. 
 
• Non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS): State not recognized by the NPT (see 
Section 2.2) as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state. NNWS are not allowed to 
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acquire nuclear weapons, and the states undertake to accept safeguards carried out 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see Section 2.3). This 
includes all signatories of the NPT, excluding the five recognised nuclear-weapon 
states. Both Norway and Iran are NNWS under the NPT (see Appendix B). 
 
• P5+1: A group that in 2006 joined the diplomatic efforts on negotiating the 
Iranian nuclear programme. The group includes the five permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council namely China, France, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Russia, plus Germany. It is also known as the E3+3 
(Henderson & Heinonen 2012).  
 
• The Six-Party talks: A group of states that in 2003 joined their diplomatic efforts 
to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns regarding the North Korean 
nuclear weapons programme. This group includes North Korea, South Korea, 
China, Japan, Russia and the United States (Høibråten et.al 2013, p.55) 
 
• Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons, capable of massive destruction (UNODA 2013). 
1.3 Operationalization 
This research aims to find variables, in addition to the invasion of Iraq, which could have 
led to the changes in the nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea and Libya. However, 
only Libya’s nuclear programme ended in 2003, so in order to find out if the 2003 
invasion of Iraq continued to affect Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes, the 
variables occurring from 2003 until today must be taken into account. The dependent 
variable is changes in the nuclear programmes of Iran, North Korea and Libya, while the 
independent variables are all other variables that could have affected the programmes.  
 
In this type of study, it is difficult to assess the impact of the independent variables and 
how the variables may affect the result of the analysis (Hellevik 2002, p.239). Dealing 
with three nuclear programmes, with a number of independent variables influencing the 
dependent variable, is challenging. Unfortunately, some variables may not be accounted 
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for, and this could be a weakness of the analysis. Being aware of this challenge is 
important when carrying out the study. 
1.3.1 Dependent variable 
As mentioned above, the dependent variable in this analysis is changes in the nuclear 
programmes of Iran, North Korea and Libya. Firstly, the word change is difficult to 
measure because it is impossible to determine for sure that a change has occurred, and to 
what degree something has changed. However, arguing that a change might have 
occurred could be possible in this case, because all three nuclear programmes did indeed 
change within 2003, the same year that Iraq was invaded. Libya gave up their nuclear 
weapon program in 2003; North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003; while Iran halted 
some of its most sensitive nuclear activities in 2003. This raises the possibility that the 
Iraq invasion might have influenced the change in the programmes. 
 
Secondly, the dependent variable contains the term nuclear programmes, which 
complexity should be further explained: All three states apparently had, to different 
degrees, activities relevant for nuclear weapons development before 2003, but 
uncertainties exist regarding what happened after 2003. Given this uncertainty, this 
research will not use the term nuclear weapons programme in the case of Iran, even 
though the international community is highly sceptical about Iran’s nuclear intentions 
also today. This is because of a challenge within the topic, namely the dual-use aspect of 
nuclear programmes. The dual use of the nuclear technology enables both a peaceful and 
military option. A state with nuclear weapons ambitions can therefore use its right to 
peaceful nuclear technology to secretly develop nuclear weapons. The fact that Iran has a 
civilian nuclear programme, with possible military dimensions, makes the Iranian case 
especially interesting. Further, this research recognizes North Korea as a de facto3 
nuclear weapon state, as the regime has conducted several nuclear tests after 2003 (2006, 
2009 and 2013), a fact that justifies the use of the term nuclear weapons programme 
when talking about the time prior to North Korea’s “nuclear breakout”. Still, the term 
weapon is somewhat misguiding in this case, because North Korea most likely only 
                                                          
3 State not recognized by the NPT (see section 2.2) as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state, possessing nuclear 
weapons. States like India, Pakistan and North Korea are de facto nuclear-weapon states.  Most likely 
Israel also possesses nuclear weapons, but this has never been publicly confirmed (Høibråten et. al. 2013). 
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possesses workable nuclear “devices”, which have not been “weaponized4” yet 
(Høibråten, Breivik, Enger, Schultz Heireng & Kippe 2013). The term nuclear weapons 
programme can also be used on Libya, although it never managed to acquire nuclear 
weapons before cancelling its programme. However, when all three states are mentioned 
together, the term nuclear programmes is best suited. 
1.3.2 Independent variables  
Acknowledging the fact that the list of variables may not be complete, the following 
variables are the most important. Further, through the analysis the variables that are most 
relevant for each specific case will be identified, as they might not be accounted for in 
advance. 
 
The first, and most interesting variable in this analysis, is the effect of the Iraq invasion 
on the nuclear programmes. This variable will receive significantly more attention than 
the other independent variables, because it also addresses security, which is an important 
aspect of the theoretical framework in so many ways. Firstly the variable addresses 
security through fear of a military attack (primarily by the United States) as the variable 
assumes that all three states had a genuine fear of being “next on the list”. While Iran, 
North Korea and Libya witnessed a fellow state within the Axis of Evil being invaded, 
the variable assumes that the “bystander” states must have felt an increased pressure, 
which led them to conduct changes regarding their nuclear programmes, within 2003. 
Secondly, another important aspect of the Iraq invasion variable is the American regional 
presence and influence, understood as the presence in Iraq, Afghanistan and South Korea 
and the influencing ability to affect regional politics, which could lead the states to 
increase or decrease their efforts regarding the nuclear programmes. While the invasion 
of Iraq was a part of the War on Terror, this research operationalize the Iraq invasion to 
encompass the War on Terror as a part of the increasing counter-proliferation pressure on 
states deemed rogue by the United States, and thereby affecting the nuclear programmes. 
Thirdly, the variable encompasses how the United States removed the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, improving security for Iran. Fourth and finally, 
the variable takes into account the fear of regime change, which could have affected the 
nuclear programmes in both ways. It is a challenge that this variable has certain 
                                                          
4 Weaponization: turning a nuclear explosive device into a weapon. This includes designing the device in 
such a manner that it fits and functions with the available delivery system (airplane, missile e.g.), thereby 
making the nuclear weapon operational (Kippe 2009, p.63). 
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similarities with the Iraq invasion variable, which makes it difficult to separate the 
influence of the two variables. 
 
The second independent variable, which may have influenced the nuclear programmes, is 
sanctions. This could either be the fear of sanctions or the effect of already implemented 
sanctions. This variable assumes that the fear of sanctions would influence the state to not 
continue its nuclear programme, while the effect of sanctions would lead a state to 
negotiate its nuclear programme, or eventually giving up its nuclear programme. 
     
The third independent variable is nuclear technology options and activities. This variable 
encompasses whether Iran, North Korea or Libya had a military programme, a nuclear 
power programme, or a programme covering both options. Further this variable will 
include the importance of access to the technology provided by the A.Q Khan network, 
but it will not go any further on describing the different states access to nuclear 
technology on general basis. This variable also assumes that some states will have more 
national expertise than others, which may affect the decision-making process. A 
disclosure of undeclared nuclear activities, like the disclosure of the Khan-network or an 
undeclared nuclear facility, could also contribute to increased cooperation from a state.  
 
The fourth independent variable is national strategy and foreign policy, which takes into 
account that one or several changes within each state’s foreign policy could have caused 
the nuclear programme to change; either towards further development or towards a stop 
in the development, as a measure taken to downscale the chance for international 
pressure. A national strategy may change as a result of a national election or a regime 
change. This could also influence the way each state look at negotiations. If the state 
perceives negotiations as beneficial, they could be willing to halt some aspects of its 
nuclear programme. However, if negotiations fail, this could lead states towards 
developing their respective nuclear programmes further. This variable also encompasses 
prestige and status as important driving forces within each state’s foreign policy, and that 
these forces could affect decisions regarding the nuclear programmes.  
1.4 Relevance and value 
This analysis is important for several reasons: North Korea has been testing its nuclear 
weapons as late as the spring of 2013, making its nuclear programme continuously 
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relevant; throughout 2013 Iran’s possible nuclear weapons programme has also received 
much attention, and it continues to reach international headlines; and Libya was attacked 
by coalition forces in 2011, an event that might not have happened if the regime had not 
given up its nuclear weapons programme in 2003, and also an event that might influences 
the decision-making of North Korea and Iran regarding their respective programmes. 
 
Further, this research is important because it analyses how the attack on one “member” of 
the Axis of Evil affected three other states of the same category, based on changes to their 
respective nuclear programmes. It is challenging to provide a sufficient overview of three 
nuclear programmes; but it will make the analysis much more unique and relevant. It is 
unique because many studies are assessing the nuclear programmes of Iran, North Korea 
and Libya separately; however, few studies compare the three cases and point out 
differences and similarities between them, which means that this research covers a 
“missing piece” in the field of science. It is relevant to other members of the axis of evil 
like Syria, which has been suspected of having a clandestine nuclear weapons programme 
(Høybråten et.al. 2013, p.120). 
1.5 Structure of the Research 
This research is divided into 6 chapters: 
Chapter 1 concerns the introduction; the topic and research question, as well as an 
operationalization of the variables for the research; and the relevance and value of the 
research. 
Chapter 2 will concern relevant background information, such as the reason for the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the importance of the NPT and the IAEA as well as a quick historical 
review of the three nuclear programmes. 
Chapter 3 will concern the methodological approach; and present how this research has 
been conducted as a document study, and how this research will retain its reliability and 
validity. 
Chapter 4 will concern the theoretical framework for this research, through the 
international relations theories realism, liberalism and social constructivism, as well as an 
explanation for why this research favours realism as the main framework, and the two 
others as substitutes. 
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Chapter 5 will be divided into two main parts, where the first part concerns the 
individual analysis of what affected the three different nuclear programmes, while the 
second part concerns a comparative analysis of all three programmes together. 
Chapter 6 will concern the final conclusions for this research. 
2 Background 
In order to understand why Iran’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s nuclear programmes came 
under scrutiny, it is necessary to understand what caused the invasion of Iraq, why the 
United States increased its effort in countering proliferation, how the international non-
proliferation regime as well as the IAEA affects the nuclear programmes in the selected 
states, as well as a quick historical review of the three nuclear programmes. 
2.1 The Relevance of the 11 September 2001, and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
The attacks on 11 September 20015 paved the way for a new use-of-force doctrine, 
calling for preventive military action against rogue states seeking nuclear weapons. The 
new doctrine lacked confidence in nuclear deterrence, as deterrence was directed at states 
already armed with nuclear weapons and not at states seeking the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons (Record 2004). In his State of the Union Address in 2002, President George W. 
Bush talked about the new concern: 
 
States like these (Iran, Iraq and North Korea), and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis 
of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these 
arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our 
allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of 
indifference would be catastrophic (George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 
January 2002). 
 
This quote illustrates how the Bush-administration deemed both national and 
international security after 11 September, stressing the need to take comprehensive action 
in order to protect American and allied soil and interests.  
 
                                                          
5 The terrorist attacks on the United States, 11 September 2001. 
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In May 2002, Libya was added to the list of rogue states, when United States Assistant 
Secretary for International Organization Affairs John Bolton presented the nations 
“beyond the Axis of Evil” (Bolton 2002). Though it started out as a war on terrorism with 
the military operations in Afghanistan, it became as much a war of counter-proliferation. 
The line was drawn from terrorist organizations to states sponsoring terrorism that might 
also have WMD programmes. On 5 February 2003, the United States Secretary of State 
Colin Powell addressed the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), stating that Iraq 
had an active nuclear weapons programme:  
 
already possessing two out of three key components needed to build a bomb 
(Colin Powell, U.S Secretary of State’s Address to the United Nations Security Council 
 5 February 2003). 
 
What Powell meant was probably that Iraq lacked fissile material (7Appendix A) but 
possessed weapons design and means of delivery. But the speech was more controversial 
than the one President Bush held on 29 January, and many analysts were sceptical about 
its contents.  
 
Operation Iraqi Liberation (later named Operation Iraqi Freedom) was launched 20 
March 2003, and within weeks Saddam Hussein’s regime was defeated. In the aftermath 
of the invasion, no nuclear weapons or other WMD were found, and no evidence of ties 
between the regime and al-Qaeda was found either. However, Washington continued the 
coercive counter-proliferation policy with a far more accusatory tone against Iran, North 
Korea and Libya. Now these states were compared with terrorist organisations as 
undifferentiated threats. As part of Washington D.C.’s sharpened tone, the term 
“preventive” – often combined with “military action” or military intervention” – were 
much used by the Bush administration, and also considered a good substitute in situations 
where traditional nuclear deterrence could not be used, and/or if dissuasion and coercive 
diplomacy had failed (Cox 2011).  
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On 31 May 2003 Washington D.C. stepped up the effort further by introducing the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)6 as an effort to prevent the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction and their related components and materials on the black marked. This 
voluntary regime (unanchored in international law) would later contribute to the exposure 
of the A.Q. Khan network7  
 
Framed as members of the Axis of Evil before the war, Iran, North Korea and Libya 
(beyond the Axis of Evil) faced international pressure in general, and American pressure 
in particular, as their nuclear programmes came into question. The United States military 
forces were obviously stretched in 2003, participating in extensive campaigns in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan, but both wars were expected to have a short duration. Hence military 
confrontation with Iran, North Korea or Libya could not be excluded as a possibility.  
This may be one reason for why the year 2003 marked a change in all three programmes: 
                                                          
6 The Proliferation Security Initiative’s origins trace back to December 2002, when legal gaps were 
revealed during the interdiction of a North Korean-flagged ship carrying missiles and conventional 
warheads. Although the ship was boarded by the Spanish navy (on request from American intelligence), 
there was no legal basis for seizing the cargo, which was eventually released. On 31 May 2003, President 
Bush introduced the Proliferation Security Initiative as an aim to use existing national authorities and 
international law to interdict shipments suspected of carrying WMD, their delivery systems and related 
material. As a product of the Bush administration’s increased counter-proliferation effort, the initiative was 
“surfing” on the very same “counter-proliferation wave” as the Iraq war. Months later, in October 2003, the 
PSI revealed a shipment of weapons related technology, bound for Libya. This led to the disclosure of the 
A.Q. Khan network (Nikitin 2012).  
 
7 The Pakistani nuclear scientist and “father of the Pakistani bomb” Dr. Abdul Qadeer Kahn stole sensitive 
technology while working at an enrichment facility in the Netherlands in the 1970s. Khan used the 
technology to assist Pakistan in the task of achieving nuclear weapons, while building a network of 
suppliers of nuclear technology.  During the late 1980s or early 1990s, Khan used his network of suppliers 
to offer other states nuclear weapons related technology, and detailed designs for nuclear weapons. Khan’s 
network was active until its disclosure in October 2003. 
 
The disclosure of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network is interesting to this research because it revealed that 
Iran, Libya and North Korea were customers of the very same black market supply network trading nuclear 
weapons related technology. After his arrest in February 2004, Khan has admitted to have sold such 
technology to these countries. And while Iran and Libya have admitted their trade with the network, North 
Korea has refused to do so (Sanger 2004).   
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On 10 January, months before the invasion, North Korea withdrew from the NPT – no 
longer obliged to refrain from nuclear weapons; during the fall, Iran initiated diplomatic 
talks under which it agreed to certain concessions and temporary limitation of its nuclear 
fuel cycle development; and on 18 December, Libya gave up its nuclear weapons related 
programme (Record 2004). 
2.2 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is fundamental in what 
is to be understood regarding the nuclear programmes of the three cases, as it strictly 
regulates all member states nuclear activities. It was initiated by the United States and the 
Soviet Union –the two first nuclear-weapon states (NWS) – in an attempt to stop any 
further spread of nuclear weapons, and introduced for signing in 1968, in which both Iran 
and Libya signed. The treaty is constructed around three interlocking pillars: nuclear non-
proliferation; peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and nuclear disarmament, which is 
captured in eleven mandatory articles (see Appendix B) of which the key articles are the 
following (IAEA 1970):  
 
• Article I: Nuclear-weapon states shall not assist other states in the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly. 
• Article II: Non-nuclear weapon states shall refrain from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. 
• Article III: Non-nuclear weapon states must accept safeguarding of nuclear 
activity.  
• Article IV: Non-nuclear weapon states shall have access to peaceful uses of 
nuclear technology.  
• Article VI: Nuclear weapon states are obliged to negotiate an agreement on 
complete disarmament. 
 
The treaty divides the world’s states into the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”, 
recognizing those states that conducted nuclear weapons tests before 1967 as legitimate 
nuclear-weapon states, with the commitment to disarm. It is worth noticing that the five 
recognized NWS also constitute the five permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council. The rest of the world was placed in the category of non-nuclear-
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weapon states (NNWS). Both India (1974, 1998) and Pakistan (1998) have tested nuclear 
weapons, but they are not members to the NPT. They are not recognized by the NPT as 
NWS, and cannot become members to the treaty unless they disarm (IAEA 1970). By 
these circumstances they are therefore often described as de facto nuclear-weapon states. 
Among the de facto states, there are two others: Israel, who has not signed the NPT, but 
is still commonly assumed to possess nuclear weapons; and North Korea, who signed the 
NPT in 1985, but withdrew from it in 2003 (as the only country in the world to have done 
so) and subsequently conducted nuclear weapons tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013. The 
withdrawal was justified through Article X (see Appendix B.10) of the NPT where North 
Korea stated that it faced threats to its national security. By doing so, the regime 
essentially allowed itself to develop nuclear weapons by using the article as a necessity 
(Cha & Kang 2004). Iran, who signed the treaty in 1968, has used Article IV-rights (see 
Appendix B.4) to come as close as possible to where Article II draws the line, while 
Libya was clearly breaking Article III, and were on the path of breaking Article II, when 
it clandestinely sought to acquire “assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons” (see 
Appendix B.2), as the BBC China8 shipment was revealed. This show a gap between how 
Iran, North Korea and Libya has chosen adhere its NPT commitments. Trying to leave 
the treaty already in 1993, the year after its accession, this shows that North never 
committed itself seriously to the NPT. However, North Korea remained in the treaty for 
ten years (till 2003), much due to the Agreed Framework, which will be discussed in 
Section 2.4.2Further, North Korea chose to not commit to the NPT after 10 January 2003, 
while the two others chose to. And so, not signing or withdrawing from the treaty means 
that the state is not obliged by international law to refrain from developing nuclear 
weapons, and does not have to have a safeguards agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see Section 2.3) the NPT’s enforcer (Bluth 2012). 
 
Since its introduction in 1968, the NPT has become an increasingly robust agreement. 
Among the signatories are states like Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Italy, 
Libya, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan and former Yugoslavia that all were 
                                                          
8 A German ship bound for Libya in October 2003, which was intercepted by the German and Italian 
authorities. The cargo consisted of centrifuge components (which were under export control) and individual 
basic components (which were not under export control). The seizure of the ship also led to the disclosure 
of the A.Q.Khan network (see footnote 7) (Breivik & Toft 2007). 
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suspected of having nuclear weapons ambitions decades ago (Bluth 2012). Other 
signatories are states who “inherited” the weapons after the Soviet Union collapsed, but 
willingly abandoned them in 1995 (Kazakhstan) and 1996 (Ukraine and Belarus). South 
Africa had nuclear weapons from 1978 to 1993, but was pressured by the international 
community to give them up, which resulted in the signing of the NPT (Mærli 2009). 
When France and China finally signed the treaty in 1992, it gave further strength to the 
international cooperation, and so in 1995 it was decided to extend the original 25 years 
duration of the treaty to indefinite (Bluth 2012). 
 
On the other hand, there are some who see signs of weakening of the NPT, especially in 
the cases where member states of the treaty appears to be developing nuclear weapons 
capabilities, either clandestinely such as Libya was suspected of and North Korea did, or 
under the disguise of a civilian programme, such as Iran is suspected of. Alongside the 
significant proliferation of the technology needed, and as a result of civil nuclear 
cooperation, the number of states capable of developing nuclear weapons is now greater 
than ever. Also, the nuclear-weapon states’ slow effort to disarm in favour of the NPT 
creates a cynicism about the treaty among the non-nuclear-weapon states who argues that 
the IAEA concentrates too much on the first three articles (non-proliferation) and too 
little on technical assistance related to (see Appendix B.4). 
 
In the cases of the selected states, Libya was as a member of the NPT when it tried to 
develop nuclear weapons, hence undermining the treaty; Iran, as a member, may have 
been trying to develop nuclear weapons for a longer time, and if Iran develops a nuclear 
weapon it could make the signatories of the NPT lose faith in the agreement, or 
encourage further proliferation; North Korea laid the foundation for its nuclear weapons 
programme while being member of the NPT, a tactic some fear Iran is currently using. 
Later, North Korea withdrew and conducted a nuclear weapon test, an action which 
obviously undermines the treaty (Bluth 2012). The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) has the authority to verify all nuclear activities in the NNWS to ensure that all 
member states comply with the NPT.  
2.3 The International Atomic Energy Agency 
Like the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency has a vital role in the 
understanding of the nuclear programmes, as is it the world’s centre for cooperation in 
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the nuclear field. Since its foundation in 1957, as an independent part of the United 
Nations system, the agency has been guided by the interests and needs of its member 
states, which shapes the agency’s mission, strategic plans and vision to be embodied in 
IAEA’s statutes. Through these statutes, IAEA’s three main pillars are defined as: safety 
and security; science and technology; and safeguards and verification (IAEA 2013a).  
 
Combined with the task of promoting safe and secure use of peaceful nuclear technology, 
the IAEA is also tasked with monitoring and inspecting the nuclear facilities and material 
in non-nuclear-weapon states, based on safeguards agreements the member states have 
developed with the IAEA. Among many responsibilities, the IAEA is looking for 
violations and signs of nuclear weapon development (IAEA 2013a). In order to ensure 
that the signatory states are living up to their commitments, IAEA uses the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA), Additional Protocols (AP) and also the 
Small Quantities Protocols (SQP) as basis for its work in the different countries. 
 
The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement was established in 1967 as a regime for 
verifying and declaring the peaceful use of special nuclear materials (see Appendix A) 
within a state through a so-called “physical inventory verification”, for material 
accountancy. The CSA was first introduced under Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America, and further used as framework when the NPT was initiated in 1968. Later 
this standard was reproduced with the name “Model Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement”, suited to be applied to both simple cases of nuclear activities and more 
complex and advanced nuclear programmes. The basic obligation in a CSA is reflected 
through Article III.1 in the NPT:  
 
to accept safeguards...for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its 
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear 
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (see 
Appendix B.3). 
 
This means that the IAEA takes account of all types of nuclear material relevant for the 
manufacturing of nuclear weapons; especially the isotopes plutonium-239, uranium-233 
and uranium-235 (see Appendix A.1.1 ). Each member state has a CSA based on the 
model agreement, which is supplemented by the Subsidiary arrangement, which is a 
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document containing the technical and administrative procedures for implementing the 
CSA. The standard CSA was in Iran on 15 May 1974; in Libya on 8 July 1980, and in 
North Korea from January 1992. But while Iran and Libya commits to their CSA’s, North 
Korea did not have to commit to any CSA after the withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. 
However, a central issue regarding Iran’s nuclear programme in 2003 was the 
ratification9 of an update to this agreement. While having ratified the model CSA in 
1974, Iran had only signed, but not ratified the CSA’s Subsidiary Arrangement from 
1976. Within the Subsidiary Arrangement was the “code 3.1” which stated that Tehran 
was obliged to report any new facility no later than 180 days before the introduction of 
nuclear material. In 1992 the code was updated, saying that states should now report new 
facilities already in the planning phase, before any construction had begun. When Iran 
started negotiating with the so-called “EU-3” in the late summer of 2003 –which will be 
discussed in the analysis section 5.1.1.1– the EU-3 demanded that the code, should be 
updated to the 1992, but Iran refused, and stating that it only had to adhere to the 1974 
terms in which it had ratified. Eventually Iran implemented the update in December 2003, 
but did not ratify it. 
 
However, the CSA only provides the IAEA access to declared activities and materials. 
This means that the agency must believe what the state declares, which means that the 
IAEA cannot guarantee “completeness” but only “non-diversion of declared materials” 
and the “correctness of the declaration”. This “hole” in the CSA is better addressed 
through the Additional Protocol. 
 
The Additional Protocol is also central when it comes to Iran’s nuclear programme, as it 
was signed in December 2003, but left in February 2006. The Protocol is a supplement 
meant to strengthen the CSA. If accepted by the state, the protocol provides the IAEA 
with broader rights, including: Access to inspect undeclared facilities; access to 
information about a state’s full nuclear cycle, and any other site where nuclear material is 
present; short-notice inspections granting access to all buildings on a nuclear site; access 
to information regarding manufacture, exports of sensitive technologies and inspection 
mechanisms for manufacturing and import locations; and collection of environmental 
samples beyond declared locations, if deemed necessary by the IAEA. Although the AP 
                                                          
9 First when the agreement is ratified the state has an obligation to declare to the IAEA the current status on 
all nuclear materials and facilities regularly. 
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might not be 100 % sufficient, it works as a tool for verifying the “completeness” of a 
state’s nuclear activities. Meaning an “assurances of the non-existence of undeclared 
nuclear activities”. The AP was signed by Iran in 2003, and implemented until February 
2006, when the IAEA reported Tehran’s noncompliance to the United Nations Security 
Council. In the case of Libya, the AP was ratified on 11 August 2006, three years after its 
decision to abandon the nuclear weapons programme. 
 
As of 9 April 2013, 180 states have brought into force a comprehensive safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA. 137 of these states have an additional protocol, and 99 states 
follow a small quantities protocol. These measures are essential in order to determine 
noncompliance with the NPT (IAEA 2013b). However, the agency has its problems: 
IAEA has determined noncompliance with Iraq’s CSA in 1991, Libya’s CSA in 2004 and 
Iran’s AP in 2006, but it lacks an established definition of noncompliance. Apparently 
this could provide the agency with the necessary flexibility to deal with complex cases, 
but it comes with a cost: Since the IAEA also supports diplomatic and political processes 
in order to avoid nuclear proliferation, it is essential to be viewed as credible, accurate, 
reliable and independent. And so the lack of clarity and consistency could have adverse 
consequences for the integrity and credibility of the IAEA safeguards system (IAEA 
2013a). This was also pointed out by the Deputy Director General and Head of the 
Department of Safeguards, Herman Nackaerts when he held the following address at the 
52nd annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) in 2011: 
 
Finally, the system was manifestly failing in its primary objective, namely, to detect 
activities that did raise potential compliance issues and proliferation concerns – such as 
those undertaken, for instance, in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran 
(Herman Nackaerts. INMM Address, 18 July 2011).   
 
As pointed out by Nackaerts, is ironical that the IAEA’s verification mandate is limited to 
ensuring the rest of the world that all nuclear material within a state are used strictly for 
peaceful purposes, but that even in states implementing the Additional Protocol, the 
agency has no explicit mandate to inspect facilities nor activities which do not involve the 
production of nuclear materials (Høibråten et.al. 2013, p.97).  
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2.4 The Drive for Nuclear Weapons in Iran, North Korea and Libya 
Although the time frame for which this research operates is set from 2000 to 2013 it is 
important to give a short historical review of the drive for each nuclear programme, 
because it supports the analysis with relevant information, that could have affected the 
behavioural change in 2003, and also the outcome of the three programmes.  
2.4.1 Iran 
Iran has a remarkable history tracing back to the Persian Empire of 500 B.C. Given this 
past Iran therefore views itself as an important regional actor (Lodgaard 2012, p.60-
63).The country’s nuclear programme can be traced back to 1957, when Shah Reza 
Pahlavi, Iran’s head of state before the Islamic revolution in 1979, signed an agreement 
on participation in the American-led Atoms for Peace programme. The Shah embarked 
on a prestigious civil nuclear programme, and Iran received a 5 megawatt (MW) research 
reactor by the United States in 1967 (Kippe 2009, p.14). Simultaneously, the Shah also 
pioneered the Middle East as a nuclear weapons free zone, and Iran was therefore one of 
the first countries in the world to sign the NPT in 1968. But during the mid-1970s the 
Shah seemingly told his chief atomic energy advisor, Akbar Etemad, that he wanted “all 
options” (Lodgaard 2012, p.60).  
 
From 1967, Iran had been an ally of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany, and received assistance in building civil nuclear infrastructure. But after the 
Islamic revolution of 1979, Iran distanced itself from the former allies, especially the 
United States. Within the same year, the United States embassy in Tehran was stormed 
by protesters, causing the break of all diplomatic ties with the United States. This affected 
the European states will to cooperate, and halted the unfinished Iranian programme, 
which included two reactors for electricity production in Bushehr (Kippe 2009, p.14-15). 
Further, the fact that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran (Sherrill 2012; Lodgaard 
2011; Kippe 2009) during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), made Tehran draw two 
conclusions after the war was over:  
 
I. The lack of international action to prevent Iraq from using chemical weapons, led 
Iran to dismiss the efficacy of treaties, international law and norms opposing the 
use of such weapons (Sherrill 2012).  
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II. As Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme was exposed during the first Gulf War 
(1990-1991), Iran (amongst others) noticed that it was possible (see 2.3) to 
establish a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, even as a NPT signatory 
with IAEA inspections according to the safeguards agreement (Kippe 2009, p.10).  
During the 1990s, Iran and Iraq were both suspected by the United States of having secret 
nuclear programmes, which led President George W.H. Bush to sign into law the Iran-
Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 23 October 1992. This marked an increase of the United 
States non-proliferation effort towards Iran and Iraq, and the suspicion towards both 
states lasted throughout the 1990s. Since the diplomatic break 1979, all American and 
European assistance for nuclear infrastructure had been cancelled, which lead Iran to 
approach China and Russia in order to continue its nuclear programme. This led to further 
sanctions by the United States, trying to prevent Iranian access to what Washington D.C. 
deemed as sensitive technology. The United States successfully persuaded China to halt 
its assistance in building Iran’s uranium conversion facility in Isfahan, and forced Russia 
to temporary suspend its involvement in developing the Bushehr reactor in Iran (Carolyn 
2000).  
2.4.2 North Korea 
Although the North Korean nuclear programme emerged after the Korean War (1950-
1953), North Korea’s and South Korea’s alliance with each superpower10 has been an 
important factor regarding the emergence of the nuclear programme. In 1957, the United 
States deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea, and followed up with military exercises 
involving nuclear-capable artillery, fighter-bombers and carrier aircraft (Lodgaard 2011, 
p.154). In 1958, the Soviet Union agreed to help North Korea establish a training facility 
for nuclear physicists in the Soviet Union, and in 1965 the Soviet Union provided North 
Korea with an IRT-2000 light water moderated 2 MW research reactor (known as 
“Reactor One”) in the newly established Yongbyon facility located northwest in the 
country. The Soviets knew that Reactor One was not well suited for the production of 
weapons usable plutonium, as the Soviet Union did not trust Pyongyang’s intentions 
despite being an allied (Kippe 2003, p.8).  
 
                                                          
10 North Korea was an allied of the Soviet Union and China (although not a superpower at the time), and 
South Korea was an allied of the United States during the Korean War. 
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Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, North Korea asked the Soviet Union to provide 
them with further light water reactors for research, but the Soviet Union required a North 
Korean ratification of the NPT. North Korea finally agreed to ratify the NPT in 1985, but 
the reactors were never delivered because the Soviet Union also demanded 
implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement, as well as a verification of the 
initial declaration. However, North Korea had started construction of its own reactor, 
commonly known as “Reactor Two”. Based on the same design as the first research 
reactors in the United Kingdom, this 20-25 MW research reactor was designed for 
nuclear power, but at the same time it was far more effective in the production of 
plutonium than Reactor One, making it central in the years to come (Kippe 2003, p.16).  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought several changes to the Korean peninsula: North 
Korea witnessed its strong ally China reorient itself towards the United States, Russia, 
Japan and South Korea, leaving North Korea essentially alone. This led head of state Kim 
Il-sung to seek improvement of international relations, by reducing the military threat to 
such a level that the United States decided to withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons 
from South Korea in December 1991 (Lodgaard 2013). In January 1992, North Korea 
signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as mentioned in Section 
2.3, and later handed over a report presenting its past nuclear activities, including the 
reprocessing and extraction of a smaller amount11 of plutonium (see Appendix A.1.2) 
(Kippe 2003, p.13). In February 1992, North Korea signed an agreement with South 
Korea with the intention to strive for a nuclear weapons free peninsula, but in early 
March 1993, the IAEA was suspecting that the regime had changed fuel rods (7Appendix 
A) in Reactor Two more times than declared. This means that North Korea in theory 
could have separated more plutonium than declared, an action that would have been 
noticed if the agency was granted access to the waste from the reprocessing facility. 
Additionally the IAEA also suspected a secret waste depot in connection with the 
reprocessing facility. In other words: Two waste depots, in which one was secret. It is 
likely that the secret waste depot would function as a source of which North Korea could 
extract plutonium in secrecy. The agency asked the United Nations Security Council to 
authorize special ad hoc inspections, and North Korea reacted by announcing its 
withdrawal from the NPT on 12 March 1993. A withdrawal from the NPT takes 90 days 
                                                          
11 American experts estimate that less than 4kg plutonium could have been extracted (Lodgaard 2013). 
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to effect after the notice is given, but after intense bilateral negotiations with the United 
States, North Korea suspended its withdrawal after 89 days had passed (NTI 2013). 
During mid-May in 1994, North Korea started replacing the fuel rods in Reactor Two. 
Although all reactors need fuel change once in a while, the circumstances around this 
situation led to suspicions of weapon ambitions (see Appendix A). The United States and 
the IAEA insisted that international monitors should be present to make sure that North 
Korea did not violate its safeguards agreement. On 13 June 1994 North Korea decided to 
withdraw from the IAEA as well. But, since North Korea had not managed to withdraw 
from the NPT, the NPT would still allow the IAEA inspections (to some degree). This is 
due to the fact that a non-compliance with the NPT did not affect the compliance of the 
independent CSA, regardless of North Korea’s new position. Two days later, the United 
States President Jimmy Carter was able to negotiate a deal, commonly referred to as the 
“The Agreed Framework” (AF), with North Korea (Kippe 2003, p.10), in which the most 
important elements were the following:  
 
• North Korea was to stop the construction of Reactor Two, and two large gaseous 
graphite reactors. 
• North Korea was to stop the fuel production plant and the reprocessing facility. 
• The international consortium Korean Peninsula Energy Development (KEDO) 
was tasked with building two 1000 MW (electric power) light water reactors 
replacing Reactor Two and Reactor Three, which subsequently were to be 
demolished when the new reactors were constructed. 
• Safe and secure handling of spent nuclear fuel. 
• IAEA must be allowed access to all nuclear facilities. 
• North Korea was to receive 500 000 tons heavy oil a year, from the United States, 
to compensate for the lack of power production from the reactors, until the light 
water reactors were completed. 
• North Korea and the United States were to cooperate on peace and security on the 
Korean Peninsula. 
• Both states were to cooperate on normalizing their political and economic ties.  
 
In short, the essence of the framework was to freeze the whole production line for 
plutonium. But for North Korea, the light water reactors (with a value of five billion 
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dollars) may have tipped the scale, making the agreement possible. Having first tried to 
acquire light water reactors through its partnership with the Soviet Union, the American 
offer was a welcome deal. Additionally the light water reactors would provide North 
Korea with a more credible peaceful rationale for its nuclear efforts. The rationale was 
credible in the sense that the old reactors could also provide power, but were less suitable 
for weapons related activities. It was possible for North Korea to build the old-fashioned 
reactors, as the design was publicly known and no enriched fuel was needed. In other 
words: The regime had somewhat of a peaceful alibi for these reactors, but not as good an 
alibi as for the light water reactors. 
            
Towards the end of the 1990s, the AF began to disintegrate for several reasons: The U.S. 
Congress was reluctant because the regime was expected to collapse soon; the oil 
shipments were delayed as a result of this reluctance; and on top of it all, North Korea 
demanded salary for its workers as well as an American label on the reactor South Korea 
was building for them (Kippe2003, p.10-16).  
2.4.3 Libya 
The origin of Libya’s nuclear weapons ambitions traces back to the coup d'état in 1969 
when Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi and a group of officers overthrew and exiled the 
ruling King Idris I. al-Qadhafi had a pan-Arabic vision in which the “Arabic bomb” 
played a central role. He believed that by taking upon itself the nuclear weapons project, 
Libya would not secure itself from Israel, but also obtaining a leading regional role in the 
conflict with the Israelis, while at the same time replace Egypt as the leading Arab state. 
Thus, the acquirement could provide Libya a “shortcut” to regional leadership (Braut-
Hegghammer 2008). But the new regime also adopted an anti-colonial and increasingly 
radical foreign policy, supporting anti-colonial movements by using terrorist and guerrilla 
tactics, which it financed and facilitated (Rieker & Braut-Hegghammer 2012, p.41). This 
radical policy may explain why the other Middle Eastern countries were less inclined to 
support Libya’s ambitions of pan-Arabic leadership during the 1980s, and may also 
explain why Libya changed its foreign policy ambitions driving the nuclear weapons 
pursuit (Braut-Hegghammer 2008). The shifting ambitions for becoming a nuclear-
weapon state changed naturally for Libya, as the desire for a leading regional role had to 
yield to the emerging need for security as a result of the state’s sponsorship of 
international terrorism, anti-Israeli activities and attempts to destabilize neighbouring 
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states in the 1970s and 1980s. All these activities had made Libya an unpopular regional 
and international actor, making security of the regime, especially from external threats, 
one of the principal interests of the al-Qadhafi government.  
 
Among the external threats Libya faced in this period, Israel’s alleged nuclear weapons 
and Israel’s bombing of the Osiraq12 reactor in Iraq was posing as obvious threats. The 
radical foreign policy of al-Qadhafi’s regime had also earned Libya a place on the United 
States list of states sponsoring terrorism, making Libya subject to American sanctions 
from 1979 (Arms Control Association 2013b). During the 1980s, the bilateral relationship 
between the United States and Libya deteriorated as the United States imposed additional 
sanctions in response to Libya’s terror funding. Towards the middle of the decade, the 
situation culminated in the American bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986. Two 
years later, Pan Am flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland killing 270 people. 
The fact that 178 of the passengers were Americans and that Libya was the prime 
suspect, made an already grave bilateral relationship ice cold. And so, when President 
Ronald Reagan characterized al-Qadhafi as the “Mad Dog” of the Middle East, and 
defined Libyan regime change as a United States policy objective (Rieker & Braut-
Hegghammer 2012, p.42), the regime started to realize the security concerns their 
“revolutionary” foreign policy had created (Braut-Hegghammer 2009). 
 
For the regime, this gave additional support to the deterrence motive. This change of 
rationale was notably mirrored in the cessation of Libya’s terror financing in the 1990s 
(Braut-Hegghammer 2009). Amongst the events that occurred during the 1980s, the 
Lockerbie bombing in 1988 would eventually become a contributing factor to the 
decision that led Libya to reverse its nuclear programme in 2003. In 1991, the 
investigation of the bombing led to two Libyan nationals, which Libya refused to 
extradite. As a result, the United Nations Security Council imposed resolution 748 from 
31 March 1992, placing an embargo, air travel restrictions and sanctions on the Libyan 
oil industry (Rieker & Braut-Hegghammer 2012, p.42). In 1993, the Security Council 
also adopted resolution 883 which included the freezing of Libyan assets and a ban on 
exports of oil equipment to Libya (Arms Control Association 2013a).  
 
                                                          
12 Osiraq was an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction, when bombed by an Israeli air strike on 7 June 
1981. 
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During the 1990s, Libya began to suffer from both the sanctions and the low oil prices. 
Suddenly the regime was unable to provide the basic needs for the population, as the 
domestic market declined and costs of import rose, while salaries of Libyan workers 
remained at the same level as in 1981. Medical and educational infrastructure suffered 
due to decreasing public funds, and even cultural institutions like that of marriage were 
negatively affected, as the rise in the price of gold created difficulties for couples to 
afford the bride’s dowry. And by 1994, the economy had reached an inflation rate of 50 
%. The terrible condition of the state led to a significant anger and resentment towards 
the government, allowing home-grown Islamist opposition groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and others to get a foothold in big cities like Benghazi. The fact that the 
opposition groups remained undefeated for three years demonstrated the regime’s 
weakness, and posed as a warning signal. By 1998, pressure on the regime was mounting 
both economically and politically, as unemployment remained high at 27 %, and losses 
from sanctions reached approximately $33 billion (Shamir 2013). Realising that 
improved relations with the outside world was necessary to secure his position, fix the 
economy and calm the rising opposition, al-Qadhafi began to take steps towards lifting 
the sanctions (Braut-Hegghammer 2009).  
 
The beginning of what eventually would lead to the end of Libya’s nuclear programme 
came in early 1999, when Libya initiated secret talks with the United States and the 
United Kingdom. As the purpose of the dialogue was to normalize relations (ending the 
United Nations and the United States sanctions) Libya had to take the first step. And so, 
on 5 April 1999 Libya handed over the two suspects of the Lockerbie bombing to Dutch 
authorities for trial in Holland, under Scottish law. Immediately after the handover, as 
well as France’s acknowledgement that Tripoli had cooperated with French officials 
investigating the UTA bombing13, the United Nations Security Council suspended its 
sanctions from 1992. In the one year long trial to follow, one of the Libyan suspects, 
Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, was convicted of murder on 31 January 2001, and as a result the 
United States demanded that Libya took full responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing, 
including economic compensation to all the victims’ families.  
                                                          
13 In 1989 an explosion caused flight 772 of the French UTA (Union des Transports Aériens) to break up 
over the Sahara Desert, killing all 155 passengers and 15 crew members. Charges were brought against six 
Libyans.  
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3 Methodological Approach 
This chapter will provide the reader with information on how this research has been 
conducted, the methods that have been used and how data has been collected and 
analysed. The purpose of this procedure is to provide the reader with a clear and logical 
understanding of how this research has collected the data that will be used analysing the 
three nuclear programmes. 
 
In any scientific research, the investigation should be verifiable in retrospect to confirm 
the validity of the research. According to Hellevik (2002, p.15), transparency in all 
aspects of the scientific method is essential to assure that other scientists can (ideally) 
achieve the very same results, when answering the same empirical question. Further, 
according to Jacobsen (2000, p.222) it is essential to the reader that the scientist accounts 
for the method and how the use of the method may have affected the results, so that the 
reader is able to criticize the result. In order to ensure that this research has high level of 
transparency, the empirical material for this research consists exclusively of 
documentation accessible to anyone. This research assumed from an early stage that it 
would be nearly impossible to get in contact with people with first-hand knowledge of the 
nuclear programmes in Iran, North Korea or Libya in order to conduct interviews. It was 
also the assessment of this research that interviewing representatives from any of the 
regimes, if actually possible, could decrease the reliability of the research if these 
individuals answered according to a political agenda. Instead, document studies were 
preferred as a method, as it would make it possible for any reader of this research to look 
for data that could disprove the findings, or if possible, generalize the results.  
3.1 What is a Method? 
The word method has several meanings: according to Oxford Dictionaries the noun 
method means a particular procedure for accomplishing or approaching something, 
especially a systematic or established one (Oxford 2013); or according to Hellevik (2002, 
p.16) a method is an approach or a tool suited to embark on a challenge or problem, 
where solving the challenge or problem leads to new knowledge. For this research the 
method represents the gathering of data that could provide the investigation with the most 
sufficient empirical evidence in order to solve the problem; to what degree did the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 affect the nuclear programmes in Iran, North Korea and Libya?  
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Any means serving the purpose of solving the challenge or problem is therefore to be 
considered as a method, and in the field of social sciences it is common to distinguish 
between quantitative and qualitative methods. This division of methods refers to the 
characteristics of the collected research data: Quantitative research is based on 
quantifiable data, where the researcher systematically acquires comparable data regarding 
several subjects of a specific kind, represented by numbers. An analysis of the numbers 
will provide the researcher with a pattern. In qualitative research, the use of data is less 
extensive, and instead the researcher seeks to explain a phenomenon through words and 
text. In order to shed a light on the chosen issue, the researcher needs to choose how to 
find and analyse relevant information. The issue itself decides what method is best suited, 
thus making a method more like a recipe in a research project. As for this research, the 
issue to be solved would seemingly have a far more interesting approach through a 
qualitative method, as this would enable the investigation to go beyond numbers and 
provide a closer look at each nuclear programme and the independent variables affecting 
them. This research is not looking for a pattern, but rather the degree of influence from 
independent variables. 
 
When it comes to the general purpose of research, it can be divided into two categories: 
either describing today’s situation in order to understand the daily challenges, or 
measuring the effect of a certain action. The purpose of this research is to see if the 2003 
invasion of Iraq possibly affected the nuclear programmes in Iran, North Korea and 
Libya, placing this research in the latter of the two categories. However, this research also 
describes today’s situation in Iran and North Korea, which still have nuclear programmes, 
because it is hard to determine when the invasion in 2003 may have stopped affecting 
their programmes. On the basis of this research issue, the choice between the qualitative 
and quantitative approach was clear: The qualitative approach is best suited because it 
enables this research to analyse a number of independent variables: Iraq invasion, 
sanctions, nuclear technology options and activities, and national strategy and foreign 
policy affecting the dependent variable: changes in the nuclear programmes of Iran, 
North Korea and Libya, in order to see how they interacted, instead of measuring 
interaction and effect by numbers. Further, this research assesses that the best way to 
understand today’s situation, is through a detailed investigation of all relevant variables, 
as the qualitative method is best suited to reveal several shades regarding an issue such as 
this (Jacobsen 2000, p.222-227).  
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3.2 Qualitative Method 
It is the opinion of this research that the qualitative method will enable the reader to gain 
sufficient knowledge about the three nuclear programmes without having to go through 
the same amount of data that has been generated during this project. Further, when 
embarking on this investigation, it seemed obvious that the project would need a more 
detailed plan on how to take full advantage of the preferred method. Therefore this 
research also needed a design. According to Ringdal (2007, p.22-23), a design or a 
research plan is a rough sketch on how to conduct a specific investigation. Four types of 
design exist within qualitative analysis: a cross section at one given time; longitudinal, at 
several points in time; case study consisting of one case; and comparative study of 
multiple cases. Given the topic of investigation, it is the assessment of this research that 
the latter design would fit best, as the research compares three different states. It could 
have been possible to use a longitudinal type of design, measuring at several times, and 
by that being able to say something about a “trend”. However, this research aims to 
establish a more firm reasoning rather than to report if the trend changed after the 2003 
Iraqi war. Also, this research aims to explain if changes occurred after 2003, and if so, 
what caused the situation to change, and what has been the effect of the changes. 
3.2.1 Advantages and Disadvantages to the Qualitative Method 
The qualitative method gives the investigation an exploratory design, which means that 
many of the route choices are made during the investigation, as new insight is gained. 
This has also been the case for this investigation, where the discovery of new nuances 
within all of the nuclear programmes has contributed to strengthen the analysis. This is 
because new information has continued to prove relevant throughout the research, and 
helped shape the analysis on each state. It has been a strategy of this research to be 
flexible when such findings occur, and this ability is one of the foremost advantages of 
the different qualitative approaches, enabling the researcher to implement new findings in 
a relatively quick and easy way. However, in this research, it is hard to draw a timeline 
from 2000 and until today, because it is possible that factors occurring before 2000 
affected the outcome of the nuclear programmes, and in that case the preferred method 
has a disadvantage that could ignore important factors that occurred prior to 2000. In 
order to ensure significant background information on each nuclear programme, this 
research has therefore chosen to present the historical development of each nuclear 
programme prior to 2000 in a chapter before the analysis. It is the assessment of this 
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investigation that this strategy will support the analysis by saving space that can be used 
for a firm analysis rather than having to account for every variable in the analysis. 
Further, conducting a qualitative analysis where two of the cases (Iran and North Korea) 
continue to develop possible independent variables, as their nuclear programmes are not 
yet concluded, is challenging and can be a disadvantage because it is hard to determine 
for how long the 2003 invasion of Iraq may have affected the nuclear programmes. Still, 
drawing lines from 2003 to 2013 will strengthen the research, giving it a ten year 
perspective on how the invasion of Iraq has affected the cases. Finally, another major 
advantage using a qualitative research method is that it may open up new and unexpected 
knowledge, which in turn may form the basis for new issues. Using qualitative methods 
as a tool, this research uses an unexplored way of analysing all three programmes 
together based on the effects of the 2003 invasion of Iraq on each nuclear programme.  
3.3 Research Design 
According to Ringdal (2007), selecting a research design has significant consequences for 
both validity and reliability, subjects this chapter will review later. The very intensive 
design of qualitative methods enables the researcher to go in depth with a selected few 
cases. Going deep into a subject such as this is, according to Jacobsen (2000), an attempt 
to gain a complete understanding of the relationship between the subject of investigation 
(the nuclear programmes), and the context (international) the subject operates within. 
Another important measure is the “width” of the investigation, where the width is 
referring to how many cases the investigation will include. Together both depth and 
width are preserved when this research conducts a comparative study of three cases.  
 
According to Ringdal (2007), an important strategic consideration is the relationship 
between the number of cases and the number of variables. The product of the two 
provides a rough indication of the workload associated with the data collection. In this 
research the limit was set to three states, in order to manage the workload. Still, the 
research is complex because it seeks to explain three cases linked to one war, instead of 
one case linked to one war, with three times the independent variables. And, although 
selecting one nuclear programme would have been a simpler task, with fewer 
independent variables to account for, all the different independent variables provide 
similarities and differences between the three selected cases, opening for exciting 
comparisons, and a much more interesting result. It was therefore the assessment of this 
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research that instead of providing an “expert” analysis of just one of the states, this 
research would provide a thorough analysis on all three states, including a comparative 
analysis, which would give a more complex and comprehensive result.  
3.3.1 Comparative Study of Three Cases 
According to Lijphart (1975, p.164), the comparative method is a method of testing 
hypothesized empirical relationships between variables…in which cases are selected in 
such a way as to maximize the variance of the independent variables and to minimize the 
variance of the control variables. It was the assumption of this research that the three 
selected cases were not only ideal but also interesting to compare, as all states had 
nuclear programmes with possible military dimensions prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq; 
all states had a hostile relationship with the United States; all states traded with the A.Q. 
Khan network, and all states changed behaviour regarding their programmes in 2003. It is 
further the assessment that theses similarities will minimize the use of control variables, 
set to four, while the geographical, political and historical differences will most likely 
maximize the variance of the independent variables. Following a diachronic timeline, this 
research will treat each state separately in the first part of the analysis. The findings from 
each case will be compared in the second part of the analysis in order to see the 
differences and similarities, enabling this research to make general conclusions based on 
all three cases. This is interesting because it could possibly provide a new way of seeing 
the nuclear programmes, especially in the case of the on-going nuclear programmes in 
Iran and North Korea.  
3.4 Collecting Data 
The data collection in this research is purely based on document studies and the review of 
published literature on the selected cases. To conduct field observation would be 
impossible because most of the events referred to in this research belong to the past, and 
important nuclear events of the present (regarding Iran and North Korea) are kept secret 
and conducted in restricted areas. Nor would it be possible to conduct interviews with the 
policymakers in either Iran or North Korea. It could have been possible to conduct 
interviews with international experts with knowledge about decision-making processes 
and the importance of the 2003 Iraq war, but instead the theme for this research has been 
discussed informally with selected national experts who have provided access to 
documents and published literature on the subjects. The reason why is because possible 
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misunderstandings or quotation mistakes during an interview could have affected the 
result of this research, and were therefore deemed a risk not taking. Further, the informal 
conversations with the national experts have often led to tips about specific documents 
worth investigating. Further, being able to study several documents regarding the very 
same issue also opens for a quick and easy comparison if findings vary, and this is a clear 
strength when collecting data. According to Hellevik (2002), the use of literature from 
several different sources is a strength when conducting a study. This research has used 
reports from the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
(IFS), the IAEA, as well as several reports from different political think tanks and official 
documents from different government institutions, which all have contributed to a 
strengthening of the theoretical basis. 
 
According to Hellevik (2002, p.88), the costs (time and money) constitute a momentum 
that highly favours data that already exist. The fact that different data exist on the nuclear 
programmes in all three cases, has been crucial to this research. At FFI, the expertise 
covers mainly Iran and North Korea, but through the collection of documents from other 
sources, such as IFS publications, the Libya part is also well covered. It is important to 
notice that the Libya part is textually shorter than the Iran and North Korea parts, but this 
is due to the significantly shorter history of Libya’s nuclear programme, which ended in 
2003.  
3.5 Reliability  
Accoording to Hellevik (2002), any scientific research must be reliable. Conducting the 
same research over again, to see if it is possible to achieve the very same results, first and 
foremost tests the reliability. This research is a document study only, as mentioned above. 
A substantial amount of these documents were downloaded from internet during the 
period from September 2012 to November 2013. Most of the documents are found on 
public websites, making it easy for anybody to trace the sources. Some reports from FFI, 
IFS and NUPI are not available on internet, but none of the reports used in this research 
contains classified information at any level. The reports are based on open sources and 
information available to anybody, a fact that maintains the reliability at a constant high 
level. Further, the IAEA base its existence on its independence from other formal bodies. 
The agency relies on the trustworthiness of all the worlds’ nations in order to do its job. It 
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is therefore likely to assume that using reports from the IAEA in this research will further 
ensure its reliability.    
3.6 Validity  
Within research, validity means that the results from the investigation answers the 
questions asked prior to the investigation. The most important assurance for high validity 
is that the research is grounded in other relevant research, and is conducted within the 
framework of the approach. One argument is that this makes research conservative, 
which is correct: research takes small steps forward. But these small steps ensure that 
research is based on other research, in order to achieve high validity (Tjora 2010). 
Sources of error will always occur. In this research, it is not certain that all interpretation 
of the findings is correct, but according to Jacobsen (2000), the more people agreeing on 
the findings, the more likely they are correct. In this research, national experts from FFI, 
IFS and NUPI have been used as “sparring partners”, reading through the empirical 
chapters and the analysis. This has contributed to ensure the correctness of the historical 
events, as well as the reasoning for the arguments, giving this research a higher validity. 
4 Theoretical Framework 
In order to understand the rationale behind the decisions that led Iran to the changes in 
the nuclear programmes, the analysis needs a theoretical framework fitting the context of 
this research. Therefore, in this chapter, the three most common international relations 
theories capable of explaining the behaviour of the three selected cases will be presented 
and discussed. The best suited theory will be selected as the main theoretical framework, 
while the remaining two will serve as substitutes, in order to provide the best possible 
explanation for why possible changes within the programmes occurred.  
 
The most basic problem facing anyone who tries to understand the contemporary world 
politics is to know which things matter and which do not, as there is much material to 
look at. Where should one start if one wanted to explain the behaviour related to Libya’s 
former aspiring nuclear weapons programme, Iran’s current nuclear weapons latency, or 
North Korea’s de facto nuclear weapons programme? Naturally each case has several 
explanations, and no definite answer to it. Facing such a problem one must resort to 
theory. In political science, theory is used to navigate through the facts in order to find 
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the right pieces for the “puzzle” that offers an explanation. According to Baylis, Smith & 
Owens (2011, p.3), theory is best explained as a framework, but what is a theoretical 
framework? 
 
In political science a theoretical framework could be described as a pair of sunglasses, 
allowing the wearer to see only the salient events related to the theory. Each framework is 
set to answer questions like: What are the basic foundations in International Relations? Is 
it individuals and their properties? Decisions and relations? Is it states and their political 
regimes and foreign policy? Or should the whole world be viewed as a social system with 
a global pattern as base for an analysis of international relations? Through the choice of a 
framework three levels/perspectives are dividing according to Østerud (2007, p.232): the 
individual, the state and the international system.  
 
The aim of this master research is to investigate if and how Libya, Iran and North Korea 
changed behaviour regarding their respective nuclear programmes after the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. Given this aim, the research appears with an international approach, 
necessitating the use of international relations theory. Such theories provide a framework 
where international relations can be analysed. These frameworks are not described best as 
a single theory, but rather as a family of theories – a “paradigm” or a “school of thought” 
(Legro & Moravcsik 1999). The main rivalling schools of thought describing world 
politics are known as realism, liberalism, social constructivism, Marxism, 
poststructuralism and postcolonialism. The three latter schools of thought could have 
served as framework for this research, but will not. Marxist theory explains world politics 
as taking place within a capitalist world economy, focusing on social classes rather than 
states, making this school of thought unfitting for the research. Poststructuralism is 
deemed unfitting because it is difficult to define the school. Postcolonialism focuses on 
the relationship between former colonial powers and colonies, which is also unfitting for 
this research. Finally, it is important to point out that the three schools above have been 
less historically influential than the more recognized schools of realism, liberalism and 
social constructivism. Each of these schools of thought utilizes various terms and 
approaches, and can be used singularly or combined in order to explain the selected 
states’ motives, intentions and behaviour regarding nuclear weapons as part of their 
foreign policy. 
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Presumably, none of these schools gives a perfect description of the real world, as the 
schools are more or less predictable in their explanation of international affairs. But how 
does one choose between theoretical frameworks and ensure the use of a suitable theory? 
According to Østerud (2007, p.244), the following three factors are important in selecting 
the appropriate framework:  
 
I. Which validity/scope does the framework have? 
II. What explanatory strength does the framework have?  
III. How simple is the explanation given by the framework? 
 
Firstly, a framework is considered valid and with the right type of scope if it can explain 
why states attempt to obtain nuclear weapons, and if two frameworks both are valid and 
provide the right scope, both can be recognized as alternatives. Two frameworks can also 
have partially the same scope if they explain the same set of phenomena while one at the 
same time also describes other phenomena. When selecting between frameworks, the 
international phenomenon subject to investigation must be declared first. In this research, 
nuclear weapon programmes are the subject of the investigation; thus a suitable 
framework which can provide a perspective on nuclear weapon programmes must be 
selected. Secondly, the explanatory strength: Which school of thought seemingly 
penetrates the subject of nuclear programmes best? It is worth noticing that both the 
scope and the explanatory strength could increase if elements from other theories are 
added. Using more than one theory is not uncommon in the study of international 
relations. Thirdly, how simple is the explanation? What is the sufficient condition 
explaining the phenomena? If the scopes are similar and the explanatory strength is the 
same, the best choice will be the theory providing the simplest explanation. 
        
Given this deliberate scientific approach, and the scope of this research, the one theory 
best capable of serving as an explanatory framework extending the empirical 
observations, will be used to explain the behaviour regarding Libya’s, Iran’s and North 
Korea’s nuclear programmes after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  The two remaining theories 
will be used as substitute and/or critique when needed, thereby possibly increasing both 
the scope and the explanatory strength according to Østerud (2007, p.244). Following are 
the presentations and critiques of liberalism, social constructivism and realism: 
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4.1 The Realist Perspective 
Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes are often viewed as the intellectual forefathers of 
international relations realism, through their respective works History of the 
Peloponnesian War and The Leviathan, addressing security dilemmas and balance of 
power. Following the two forefathers were writers like Edward Hallett Carr, Hans J. 
Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr who focused their attention on understanding the 
cause of war so as to find a remedy for its existence, during the inter-war period (1919-
1939). Their approach to the problem was seeing the world as it “really is” rather than 
how they would like it to be, and so by these standards the world was not a very pleasant 
place (Lamy 2011, p.117).  
 
From the realist perspective, the actors are the states. Emphasizing the ubiquity of power 
and the competitive nature of politics in the international arena, the realistic worldview is 
described as static, survival and self-help based, set in a condition of anarchy. By 
anarchy, realists mean that international politics takes place in an arena without any 
central authority or form of control. In this arena, each state considers itself to be its own 
highest authority, not recognizing anything higher. The essential logic for realists is 
drawing a sharp distinction between anarchy among actors and hierarchy within them 
(Legro & Moravcsik 1999). Given these conditions, the first priority of a state leader is to 
ensure the survival of the state. In order to do so, a leader must follow the doctrine of 
raison d’état (reason of state), which means following a set of maxims on how to conduct 
their foreign affairs in order to ensure the security of the state. With security as a means 
of survival, realists also acknowledge that some states survive on behalf of others. The 
fact that Poland has lost its existence four times in the past three centuries (Dunne & 
Schmidt 2011, p.86) is an example of how other states used Poland to increase their own 
security and survivability, while it also illustrates how realism can be a game of “eat or be 
eaten”.  
 
Together with classical realism, the rest of the realist family consists of neoclassical 
realism, offensive realism and neorealism. Neoclassical realism acknowledges the same 
structural influences as classical realism, but stresses the importance of how both the 
government and individual characteristics impact the state’s behaviour towards the 
international balance of power, and how the state can utilize its power. Alternatively, 
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neorealism is an often-used term describing today’s realism. Neorealism stresses that 
states that claim sovereignty will be forced to develop offensive military capabilities in 
order to protect themselves, while extending its power. As such, actors pose a threat to 
each other. Uncertainty, leading to a lack of trust, is also defining for the neorealist view, 
as cooperation amongst actors is possible, but always deemed risky. A realist will only 
cooperate as long as it is beneficiary, and non-threatening to the sovereignty (Sagan 
1996-1997). Also neorealists stress the importance of the structure (so called “structural 
realists”) in the international political system, which affects the behaviour of all states. 
Thus, during the Cold War, the two main actors (the United States and the Soviet Union) 
who dominated the international system, imposed certain rules of behaviour on the other 
states. Now that the Cold War is over, the structure of international politics is said to be 
moving towards multipolarity, after a phase of unipolarity during the 1990s according to 
Baylis, Smith & Owens (2011, p.5). 
 
When it comes to nuclear weapons, realists are divided into defensive and offensive 
realists. Combined, the two emphasize that nuclear weapons both serve as a defensive 
deterrent component and an offensive coercive component. Hence, nuclear weapons are 
deemed defensive when protecting a state from another state’s aggressive actions, and 
offensive by the threat of first use and/or retaliation. This is illustrated when neorealists 
like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer (Roth 2007) argue that nuclear weapons 
enable weaker states to balance stronger states, as the weapons deter and prevent 
aggression and conflict, guaranteeing the security of the possessor state. This correlates 
with the basic principle of survival, as realists see nuclear weapons as a security 
guarantee for the survival of the state (Sagan and Waltz 2003). 
4.1.1 Selecting Realism 
Applying Østeruds (2007) criteria for choosing a framework, the scope of realism is 
generally fitting very well when it comes to international relations. The school focuses on 
the international arena where each state acts according to its own interests. When it 
comes to the explanatory strength, the theory has only one level – the state level – which 
means it mostly ignores the national level and the individual level. But at the same time 
realist Scott D. Sagan argues that: 
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the best theories are those that explain the largest number of cases and that the largest 
number of positive nuclear weapons decisions in the past (the United States, the Soviet 
Union, China, Israel, Pakistan) and the majority of the most pressing proliferation cases 
today (Iraq, Libya, and possibly North Korea and Iran) appear to be best explained by 
the security model (Scott D. Sagan 1996-1997, p.85).   
 
Further, the simplicity of the explanation: All three states (Iran, North Korea and Libya) 
had a nuclear programme before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and realism could 
contribute in describing the change in these programmes based on terms of security and 
self-help. By fulfilling the required criteria for choosing a theory, realism as a framework 
seems to be the best alternative, a decision that is also backed by following two 
arguments: Firstly, since the Second World War, the pendulum swung towards liberalism 
after the creation of the United Nations, then towards realism during the Cold War, then 
back to liberalism during the New World Order of the 1990s, and now one could argue 
that we have been moving back towards realism after 9/11, as the United States and its 
allies have sought to consolidate their power and punish those whom they define as 
terrorists and the states that provide the terrorists with shelter (Dunne 2011, p.103). 
Secondly, realism is assumed to be the easiest way to explain North Korea’s nuclear 
behaviour, since the inside of the regime is essentially sealed off for data collection for 
liberalism or social constructivism. However, realism does not look inside the state. This 
is often referred to by critics of realism as the “black box” example, emphasising that a 
state is not a "black box", and that there may be other influences on foreign policy 
decisions. 
4.2 The Liberal Perspective  
Focusing on multinational cooperation and international organizations, liberalists 
question the idea of the state as the main actor in international politics. In those areas in 
which the state acts, they tend to think of the state not as a uniform actor but a set of 
bureaucracies, each with its own interests. By these standards, liberalism addresses both 
the individual level and the international level, stressing the importance of bureaucrats’ 
interests inside a state, and the possibility of international cooperation outside the state. 
Although the ideas of liberalism are old, the rise of liberalism as an international relations 
theory stems from Europe in the 1980s, and gained increasing popularity at the end of the 
Cold War, resulting in a democratic wave. According to liberalist theory, democracies do 
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not go to war against other democracies (Sagan 1996-1997), so the belief in international 
cooperation, with a trust in global institutions, leads to an approach within liberalism 
often called neoliberalism or liberal institutionalism. This form of liberalism emphasizes 
how international institutions have a positive impact on the world community. The reason 
is because international institutions are autonomous actors able to facilitate cooperation 
between states. Hence, the more autonomous institutions and higher resolution level they 
have, the more institutionally linked the world, and the smaller states’ need to fear each 
other's actions (Baylies, Smith & Owens 2011, p.4; Mayer 2013). 
 
Liberalism also provides a settlement with the realist paradigm, assuming that 
international relations may concern dialogue instead of conflict. However, supporters of 
liberalist ideas accept many of the same assumptions of realism about the continuing 
relevance of military power in international relations, but highlight the importance of 
institutions as a framework for cooperation, which could enable actors to overcome 
dangers such as security competition between states, according to Baylis (2011, p.237). 
The international cooperation regarding the NPT and the Global Zero movement – 
fronted by Norway amongst others – are examples of international law and 
multilateralism that fit the tenets of international relations liberalism (Mayer 2013). 
 
When it comes to nuclear weapons, liberalists view bureaucratic struggles and the 
competition for power inside a state as crucial. Liberalists contend that a state will seek 
nuclear arms as a means to accomplish some domestic end. They can either be used as an 
effort to gain popularity, like the Indian nuclear test in 1998, which was viewed by some 
as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s effort to generate domestic public support for 
his nationalist Bharatiya Party; or they can be used to justify economic problems as a 
sacrifice made by the people to permit the state’s technological progress (Mayer 2013). 
Some liberals also argue that inward-looking regimes located in the neighbourhood of 
other inward-looking regimes are more prone to pursue nuclear weapons than outward-
looking regimes (Sherrill 2012). 
4.2.1 Critique 
Applying Østerud’s (2007) criteria for choosing theory, the scope of liberalism covers 
two levels, both the international and the individual actor’s level. However, liberalism 
often has an optimistic and idealistic approach to international relations, outweighing 
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important factors as self-interest and pursuit of power and status, and thereby reducing its 
explanatory strength. As an example, liberalism fails to explain the Cold War, where two 
allegedly rational opponents chose an arms race with Mutual Assured Destruction instead 
of diplomacy (Mayer 2013; Sherrill 2012). And so, how would liberalism as an 
international relations theory explain the following: North Korea’s withdraw from the 
NPT; or Iran’s refusal to ratify the Additional Protocol? 
 
This leads to the conclusion that liberalism in this research will only serve as a substitute 
and critique of the main theory, on subjects the main theory does not cover completely.  
4.3 The Social Constructivist Perspective  
Social constructivism had its beginning in the 1980s, when critics drew from realism and 
liberalism, arguing that liberalism and realism was ignoring social forces such as identity, 
ideas, knowledge, interests, norms and rules. Social constructivists stress that these 
factors should also be considered influential on states’ identities and interests, as well as 
the very structure of global politics. Pioneers of this school of thought, such as John 
Ruggie, Richard Ashley, Nicholas Onuf and Alexander Wendt all challenged the former 
critical and sociological theories by demonstrating the effect of normative structures on 
world politics (Baylies, Smith & Owens 2011, p.5-8). The end of the Cold War –in 1989 
created a new intellectual space for scholars keen to challenge the existing theories– 
which the constructivists did, demonstrating how attention to norms and states’ identities 
could help uncover important issues neglected by realism and liberalism. By identity, 
social constructivists see knowledge, symbols, rules, concepts and categories as the 
constructing elements that determine how actors interpret their world (Mayer 2013). 
Reality is therefore not given, but is to be constructed through historically produced and 
culturally bound knowledge. This affects the view on the use of power: not only the 
ability of one actor to get another actor to do what it does not want to do otherwise, but 
also as the production of identities, interests and meanings that limit the ability of actors 
to control their own fate (Barnett 2011). 
 
When it comes to nuclear weapons, constructivists emphasize the symbolic importance 
leaders tend to attach to nuclear weapons, which are acquired in order to establish the 
identity of an independent state capable of technically advanced prestige projects, 
deserving special recognition (Mayer 2013). From a sociological perspective, the identity 
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and prestige linked to nuclear weapons serve as a projector of national pride, in the sense 
that the weapons become a symbol of progress and modernity for the people. 
Paradoxically the international community tries to diminish the pride and prestige of 
having nuclear weapons through the NPT – a treaty initiated by some of the five “legal” 
nuclear-weapon states, who also happen to be the five permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council. Needless to say, this fact does not escape notice (Sherrill 
2012). 
4.3.1 Critique 
Applying Østerud’s (2007) criteria for choosing theory, social constructivism fulfils the 
requirement on the scope of the perspective, as the theory is capable of explaining why 
states would seek to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the problem with constructivism 
is its explanatory strength, since there are aspects of the empirical record that 
constructivism cannot account for. The symbolic, strategic and political effect of nuclear 
weapons may be based upon widespread and accepted social opinions, but that does not 
take away the very realness of this symbol, as it has been used in actual warfare, twice. 
This draws a thin line between what is socially constructed, and what is a very powerful 
weapon. According to Mayer (2013) the social constructivist argument rests on shared 
complex social meanings of nuclear weapons – from their power status to the taboo 
associated with their use – that cut across states and cultures is a proposition that may be 
difficult to prove. This is undermined by empirical evidence such as the continued 
existence of North Korea’s regime while Gadhafi’s has disappeared, which is weakening 
the constructivist explanation. Further, empirical evidence undermines the constructivist 
explanation, such as Russia’s response to the emergence of the United States as a nuclear-
weapon state. And how can norms and values explain why states like South Africa, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Libya gave up their nuclear weapons, while the same norms and 
values influences Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and influenced North Koreas to become a de 
facto nuclear-weapon state? Checkel (1998) emphasizes that constructivism sometimes 
fail in explaining how the importance of social structures may wary across nations, as 
demonstrated above. In addition, he argues that constructivism faces challenges in 
explaining how social structures are created, and how they change over time. 
Constructivism also has a problem explaining why states that acquire nuclear weapons, 
increase and renew their arsenals and develop multiple ways of deployment and delivery 
systems? This indicates a more strategic and adaptable ambition beyond that of 
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symbolism (Mayer 2013). By these arguments, the third criterion for choosing a theory 
makes the social constructivist explanation slightly superficial. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that, for this research, social constructivism provides neither 
the explanatory strength nor the simplicity of the explanation required to fulfil the criteria 
of choice. It will therefore be used as a substitute and/or critique on subjects the main 
theory (realism) does not cover completely. It is also worth noticing that social 
constructivism is not always accepted as an equal international relations theory in 
academic forum, as many scholars see the theory as less realistic (Mayer 2013). 
5 Analysis 
This chapter is divided into two parts, where the first part presents the individual analysis 
of the three nuclear programmes, while the second part presents the comparative analysis. 
5.1 Analysis of Iran’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s Nuclear Programmes 
5.1.1 Analysis of Iran’s Nuclear Programme 
The case of Iran differs from that of Libya and North Korea, as Iran halted the alleged 
nuclear weapons related activities in the fall of 2003. Although no definite evidence 
exists, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued a report in 2007, 
claiming with “high confidence” that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme prior to the 
fall of 2003/early 2004. Further, the estimate concluded with “moderate confidence” that 
no such activities had resurrected in 2007 (NIE 2007). The IAEA followed suit in a report 
from 2011, claiming with “overall credibility” that evidence did exist, and that Iran had 
nuclear weapons ambitions prior to 2003 (IAEA 2011). Iran on the other hand has never 
admitted any such activities. However, Iran suddenly changed behaviour regarding its 
nuclear programme in 2003, the same year as neighbouring Iraq was invaded based on 
allegations of nuclear weapons possession. It is therefore tempting to suggest that Iran’s 
sudden change could have been influenced by the invasion. This analysis will argue that 
the Iraq invasion-variable had a strong influence on the behavioural change in 2003 
together with the sanctions-variable. Further, this analysis will discuss the factors that 
made the Iranian nuclear dispute continue after 2003 and until today. That could be 
explained through the Iraq invasion variable and the national strategy and foreign policy 
variable.  
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5.1.1.1 What Caused Iran to Halt? 
At the beginning of the new millennium, Mohammad Khatami was in his first term as 
President (1997-2001). Described as a “constructive idealist”, Khatami sought to better 
Iran’s regional and international reputation (Wastnidge 2011). This diplomatic rebranding 
of the national strategy and foreign policy was also an important step in improving the 
relationship with the United States and the European Union, which had been in a poor 
condition since 1979. Khatami’s idealist policy and diplomatic approach continued 
through his second presidential period (2001-2005) and it is reasonable to believe that it 
was the fear of sanctions that contributed to the step towards improved relations during 
Khatami’s first term. However, in Khatami’s second term it is more likely that the fear of 
an attack, given the American military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, affected the 
Iranian behaviour. Either way, both reasons was based on the fear that the lack of will to 
cooperate could have consequences, and that cooperation was beneficiary. According to 
realism, states cooperate only when forced to, or when it is beneficiary for the security of 
the state. Further, it is important to notice that even though Iran had a nuclear weapons 
programme during the presidency of the idealistic Khatami; it does not mean that 
Khatami had any final say on the nuclear weapons issue. It is possible that the President 
did not favour nuclear weapons, while the Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei did.  
 
Perhaps a more tangible factor that could help explain the 2003 halt, are the events in the 
aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks, where the risk of nuclear weapons 
pursuit for states deemed as rogue states by the United States, was highlighted. Termed 
such a state, the pressure on Iran increased during the “War on Terror” that followed, and 
even more when President George W. Bush referred to Iran as part of the Axis of Evil in 
his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002. Already labelled as an enemy of the 
United States, Iran was taken out of the frying pan and into the fire by the disclosure on 
14 August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) held a press 
conference in Washington D.C. claiming that the Iranian regime was building secret 
nuclear facilities near the cities of Natanz and Arak. Although the NCRI, at that time, did 
not know what they had revealed in Natanz, the facility was later identified as a large-
scale uranium enrichment facility. Arak was later confirmed as a facility for a heavy 
water production plant and a heavy water research reactor. Both facilities may have 
peaceful applications, but could also be relevant in a military nuclear programme (see 
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Appendix A). This got IAEA’s attention, since Iran had not declared these activities 
under its Safeguards Agreement. In order to reduce the mounting pressure, Iran followed 
up by issuing a statement on 16 September 2002 claiming that the activities were for civil 
purposes, and further referred to its right to do so according to NPT’s Article IV (see 
Appendix A). Furthermore, the regime referred to its subsidiary arrangement (from 1976) 
which did not require Iran to inform the agency of future nuclear facilities until 180 days 
before nuclear material was to be introduced into each specific facility, as mentioned in 
Section 2.3. Iran could therefore legally continue its activities, because it had not 
accepted nor ratified any update of code 3.1 and was still following the “six months 
clause” from 1976 (Kippe 2009;  as mentioned in Section 2.3). As mentioned earlier, the 
NIE from 2007 claimed that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme in this period. It is 
therefore possible that the fear of sanctions or a military attack was outweighed by the 
tempting technological achievements Iran could gain, if this extra “window of time” was 
preserved. According to realism, Iran would interpret the agreement by the old rules 
because this was more beneficial, demonstrating that the first priority was its own 
interest, which is also an element in realism. Further, if Iran were developing a 
clandestine nuclear weapons programme, the 180 days clause would be of great strategic 
importance, in order to buy time. If this was the case, Iran would also here be following 
realism through the raison d’etat, in order to ensure the security of the state. 
 
However, in October 2002 Iran decided to let the IAEA inspect Natanz and Arak. It 
seems likely that pressure building across the border (in Iraq) could have spooked the 
Iranian regime towards this decision, while Iran also must have kept in mind that restraint 
regarding its nuclear facilities could potentially lead to sanctions. Once again, Iran acted 
according to realism, cooperating based on the fact that it was necessary and beneficial. 
The inspection did not take place until March 2003, but during their visit the Director 
General of IAEA (at that time), Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, and his team of inspectors 
concluded that the underreporting was in obvious violation of the safeguards agreement, 
but not necessarily of the NPT (Lodgaard 2012). The alleged underreporting referred to 
violations of the Safeguards Agreement such as: the use of uranium in test-centrifuges; 
import of various types of uranium; and tests on separating small amounts of plutonium. 
Iran should have reported such activities to the IAEA (see Appendix A) (Høibråten et.al. 
2013). Still, Iran claimed no violation and continued to refer to Article IV (see Appendix 
A) saying it was for peaceful intentions only. It is likely that Iran must have felt the 
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pressure of the agency’s conclusions regarding Natanz and Arak, because Iran sought to 
negotiate. Given the non-existing diplomatic connections between Tehran and 
Washington D.C, the Swiss ambassador14 to Tehran, Tim Guldimann received a letter 
from the government of Iran on 2 May 2003, issuing a bilateral proposal to the United 
States. Among the key points were:  
 
• Relief of all U.S. sanctions on Iran 
• Cooperation to stabilize Iraq 
• Full transparency of Iran’s nuclear programme, including the Additional Protocol 
• Cooperation against terrorist organizations, particularly the Mujahedin-e Khalq 
and al-Qaeda 
• Iran’s acceptance of the Arab League’s 2002 “land for peace” declaration on 
Israel and Palestine 
• Iran’s full access to peaceful nuclear technology, as well as chemical technology 
and biotechnology 
Obviously the Iranian regime felt the need to be as transparent as possible to avoid 
sanctions from the UNSC, or even worse; military action from the United States. The fear 
of the United States makes it possible to link the Iranian offer to the invasion of Iraq: It 
took the United States only weeks to beat the same Iraqi army that Iran had used eight 
years (1980-1988) to fight, a fact that must have been noticed in Tehran. Nevertheless, 
the letter did not say anything about suspending uranium enrichment (Arms Control 
Association 2003). It is possible that Iran refrained from addressing this issue because the 
Iranian nuclear programme was a prestige project, where the national strategy seamed to 
withhold its right to enrichment through Article IV (see Appendix B.4). The will to 
negotiate in order to improve bilateral relations is an element of liberalism, which could 
have provided a theoretical explanation for the Iranian offer, however both realism and 
social constructivism undermines any liberalist explanation for why Iran came forward 
with this offer. In terms of realism, Iran felt threatened by the United States and/or 
sanctions, and sought to reduce the threat by improving relations; and in terms of social 
constructivism, the theory stresses the fact that the Iranian offer included no suspension 
of the uranium enrichment, as Iran maintained its right to do so by Article IV. Iranian 
                                                          
14 Since the Iran hostage crisis of 1979, the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran has represented the United 
States government in Iran.  
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seamed to follow national strategy and foreign policy where prestige and status was 
seemingly unwavering. It appears that by these standards, Iranian national pride weighed 
more than the country’s fear of an invasion, at this point. The Iranian proposal did 
however include an acceptance of the Additional Protocol (Arms Control Association 
2003), which indicated Iran’s willingness to cooperate substantially with the IAEA on 
nuclear issues. The reason why, might be that Iran viewed the acceptance of the AP as a 
way of avoiding sanctions. Still, because the proposal did not address the enrichment 
issue, Washington D.C. dismissed it, because the Bush administration did not want to 
allow Iran any right to enrichment (Arms Control 2013b). Finally, it is worth noticing 
that the 2 May 2003 letter marked the first effect on the Iranian nuclear programme after 
the invasion of Iraq had started, making Iran more eager to negotiate its programme.  
 
Ever since the inspections in February 2003, the IAEA had received information from the 
NCRI that the regime was possibly conducting enrichment activities at the Kalaye 
Electric Company in Tehran, and wanted access to the sites to conduct environmental 
samples. Iranian authorities acknowledged that the Kalaye facility was used for the 
production of centrifuge components, but that no enrichment involving nuclear material 
had taken place, also stating that they would not allow full access or environmental 
samples until the Additional Protocol was in force. The reason for denying IAEA access 
at first may be to avoid any linking technical activities to possible military dimensions. If 
Iran was conducting activities related to military use of nuclear technology, it would 
seem natural to deny the agency access. However, the Iraq invasion, and the increased 
pressure which the invasion brought with it, combined with continuing concern of 
sanctions, seems to have convinced Iran to allow IAEA access, thereby weighing heavier 
than the national pride and prestige. Once again, Iranian actions were driven by the fear 
of negative consequences, and according to realism, all states seek to minimize the 
consequences in order to secure the state. On 18 August 2003 IAEA was allowed to take 
samples at Kalaye. The samples showed traces of enriched uranium in the installations, 
and samples from other places, including the Natanz facility, also revealed evidence of 
highly enriched uranium. This was a major blow for the Iranian regime, having denied 
the existence of such activities. Iran’s atomic energy organisation suggested that the 
traces of highly enriched uranium could have been from second-hand imported 
centrifuges that had been contaminated before the transport to Iran, and that the traces 
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were probably from another country’s nuclear weapons programme15 (Mousavian 2012, 
p.112-113). This lead the Board of Governors to issue a resolution on 12 September 2003 
calling on Iran to “suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities”, as well as 
giving Iran till the end of October 2003 to “come clean” with the failures identified by the 
agency, as well as to cooperate fully (IAEA 2003).  
 
Meanwhile, in the absence of an American will to negotiate the implementation of the 
Additional Protocol with Iran, the effort was picked up by the EU-3 (representatives from 
the United Kingdom, Germany and France). The European countries had a softer and 
more preferred tone towards Iran than that of the Bush administration, which mantra was: 
you don’t talk to evil, you take action against it (Lodgaard 2012, p.61). And at this point 
the EU-3 was Iran’s only real option given the fact that they could prevent the United 
States from conducting military action against Iran directly or indirectly through a United 
Nations Security Council resolution which would allow the same. Iran also wanted to 
cooperate with the European countries because this potentially could prevent or delay 
UNSC sanctions against Iran. This indicated that the cooperation with the EU-3 might be 
an influential variable. Further, the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network, as mentioned in 
Footnote 7, in the same period, might also be a variable contributing to the cooperation, 
because the illegal trade could be interpreted as a violation of Article II in the NPT. 
However, the unfolding of the A.Q.Khan network had not revealed any Iranian violations 
by the time the talks between Iran and the EU-3 started on 21 October 2003. This 
strengthens the argument that it was the fear of American military presence, and perhaps 
also sanctions, that convinced Iran to negotiate, while the disclosure of the Khan network 
could be seen as a less influencing variable. 
 
Prior to the 21 October meeting, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
(AEOI), Gohlam Reza Aghazade, Irans Chief Nuclear Negotiator (current President of 
Iran) Hassan Rouhani and the Director General of the IAEA at that time, ElBaradei, met 
in Iran on 16 October. The main topic discussed was the IAEA’s Board of Governors’ 
request from 12 September, calling for “suspension”. ElBaradei made it clear that if Iran 
avoided the introduction of uranium hexafluoride (see Appendix A) gas into the 
                                                          
15 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme 
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centrifuges, it would be considered to have suspended its enrichment activities 
(Mousavian 2012, p.101). 
 
And so, when Iran met with the EU-3 foreign ministers on 21 October 2003, it was a 
surprise when the EU-3 insisted on a far more extensive definition than the one ElBaradei 
had projected to Iran prior to the meeting. Fearing the breakdown of the negotiations, 
chief negotiator Rouhani called the President and the Office of the Supreme Leader and 
explained the status. They agreed that Iran would temporarily and voluntarily suspend 
enrichment, based on ElBaradei’s definition, and nothing further (Mousavian 2012, 
p.102). This led to the signing of the “Tehran Statement”. The basis for the statement was 
that the EU-3 was to prevent Iran’s nuclear programme from becoming an issue for 
UNSC sanctions, if Iran implemented the Additional Protocol and accounted for all 
aspects of the nuclear programme to the IAEA. This facilitated cooperation between Iran 
and the IAEA, and marked the beginning of a confidence building process, unlike the 
relationship prior to the agreement. The effect of the Tehran Agreement also appears to 
have been that Iran was led to believe that a temporarily suspension of gas was sufficient, 
thereby making an agreement much more acceptable for Iran. In the wake of the 12 
September 2003 resolution, Iran had seemingly faced two options, both of which led to 
the UNSC. After getting out of this quandary, Iran decided to respond immediately to one 
of the main requests of the IAEA Board of Governors, by presenting a complete report of 
its nuclear programme. Arguably the fear of sanctions and/or worse had trumped Iran’s 
need for prestige, from months before.  
 
On 23 October 2003 the report was released, where Iran admitted carrying out undeclared 
tests on centrifuges. This was controversial based on previous Iranian statements in 
general and the statement in February 2003 in special, given that these activities were in 
no violation of the Safeguards Agreement (Mousavian 2012, p.111). Now the new report 
admitted that the activities in fact were in violation of the Safeguards Agreement. It 
appears that, the invasion of Iraq might be a reason for why these activities were refused 
in the early months of 2003, because the pressure was mounting on Iran’s neighbour state 
and Iran feared to be drawn into the conflict. This rationale behind refusing right before 
the invasion can be interpreted through realism, where security and survival could be 
ensured trough denying the existence of such activities. Further, admitting such actions in 
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the October 2003 report could also be seen as an effort to avoid the very same threat to 
security, but it is more likely that the fear of sanctions contributed equally at this point.  
 
However, problems occurred soon after the Tehran Statement. On 17 November 2003 
Iran confronted the EU-3 ministers, because the definition of suspension had begun to 
diverge from ElBaradei’s original definition16. It seemed to Iran that the technical 
definition of suspension was replaced by a more political agenda. Complaining about 
this, Iran received the answer that “ElBaradei is not the IAEA”. However, the Tehran 
Statement was a mutual victory for Iran and the EU-3, taking the “wind out of the sails” 
of the American push for international convergence against Tehran’s interests, which 
could have ended in a repetition of Iraq’s experience (Mousavian 2012, p.106-107). 
Eventually Iran suspended the enrichment on 8 December, and signed and implemented 
the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003.  
 
According to realism the decision to suspend the enrichment activities and sign the 
Additional Protocol may be explained by the threat of war contemplated by an American 
administration in a mental state of hubris, which means that the invasion of Iraq had an 
effect on Iranian decision-making even at the end of 2003. However, it is also possible to 
view Iran’s month-long reluctance to make any decision by arguing that Iran’s strategy 
was to not give up its right to enrich, because of the prestige and status within the nuclear 
programme. If that was the case, the decision could be interpreted as acting in favour of 
social constructivism. However, the fact that Iran eventually halted the enrichment, and 
signed the AP makes it likely that that security concerns were taken more into account 
than prestige.  
 
Finally, a more speculative factor that could have caused Iran to halt its enrichment is the 
United States invasion of Afghanistan and later Iraq, arguably removing two of Iran’s 
major regional adversaries in the shape of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Saddam’s 
WMD programme and his use of chemical agents during the 1980-1988 war was 
arguably one of the driving factors for Iran’s nuclear weapons programme from the end 
of the 1980s and through the 1990s. Not until Saddam Hussein was removed and no 
                                                          
16 In his 2011 memoir, ElBaradei explains that there is a distinction between a purely technical definition 
and political demands. Technically, suspension required only halting the introduction of gas into 
centrifuges. 
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nuclear weapons were found, could the Iranian regime be sure that Iraq did not possess 
any nuclear weapons. One could argue that the absence of regional enemies must have 
contributed towards the decision to halt the nuclear programme in 2003 –a logic that may 
well have been reinforced by the presence of American troops on “the doorstep”– but this 
is a rather speculative argument without any documentation. Another theory is that Iran 
had already made so much progress on the non-nuclear components of the nuclear 
weapons that halting the programme would be of little importance (Lodgaard 2012). This 
theory is also supported by the IAEA’s Director General Report from 2011, which 
renders circumstantial evidence that Iran was conducting research on non-nuclear 
weapon-components as early as 1996 (IAEA 2011). If this is correct, it means that Iran 
could have succeeded in the most essential factors, enabling the design of a nuclear 
warhead to a modified version of the Shahab-317 missile, already in 2002/2003. 
5.1.1.2 What Causes Iran to Continue? 
The Iranian decision to suspend uranium enrichment in 2003 could have been a major 
step towards an abortion of the country’s nuclear programme, and thereby the possible 
military dimensions. Instead, several factors prevented such an outcome, making the 
Iranian nuclear dispute unresolved until this day. The negotiations continued in 2004, 
with the Brussels Agreement in February, where Iran agreed to extend suspension of the 
enrichment process, as well as suspending the manufacture of parts and assembly of 
centrifuges, while the EU-3 agreed to push the IAEA for a closure of the Iran case by 
June 2004. The cooperation indicates that Iran probably was affected by the fear of 
sanctions, while at the same time convinced by an optimistic hope that these activities 
could be restarted soon, to halt some aspects of its nuclear programme. But problems 
occurred on the side-line. In January 2004 Dr. A.Q. Kahn (see footnote 7) admitted 
export of sensitive nuclear technology to Iran through the A.Q. Khan network, and in 
May 2004 satellite photos of a facility in Lavizan-Shian in Tehran, allegedly a centre for 
nuclear weapons-design development, brought suspicion; If Iran had nothing to hide, why 
would the facility exist in November 2003, but be razed by May 2004 (Kippe 2009), 
before the IAEA was allowed access? According to NIE (2007) Iran’s nuclear 
programme might have had possible military dimensions at the end of 2003 or even the 
beginning of 2004. If all military aspects of the programme were halted in late 2003, the 
                                                          
17 Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), based on North Korean technology. The modified version may 
allow a nuclear warhead to be implemented in the nose section (Høibråten et.al., p.105).    
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termination of the facility could be seen as an attempt to adhere to its NPT commitments. 
But, if Iran still pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons programme by May 2004, 
chances are the facility was razed in order to avoid further suspicion. Because of the 
satellite photos Iran’s nuclear programme was still on IAEA’s agenda by June 2004 
because there were doubts about Iran’s compliance with the Brussels Agreement, and the 
agency issued a resolution on 18 June expressing its concern (IAEA 2004). Disappointed 
and angered by the lack of trust from the IAEA, Iran protested by stating withdrawal 
from the Brussels Agreement, and continued the manufacture of parts and the assembly 
of centrifuges (but not the introduction of gas into the centrifuges) (Mousavian 2012, 
p.136-138).  
 
However, the parties managed to reach a new agreement in Paris – known as the “Paris 
Agreement”– on 14 November 2004 where the statements of 21 September 2003 were 
reaffirmed, the Additional Protocol was implemented, and Iran agreed to continue the 
suspension and to stop the uranium conversion facility in Isfahan (Mousavian 2012, 
p.145-151). The fact that Iran decided to continue cooperating could mean that the effect 
of the Iraq invasion still affected the Iranian decision-makers, but it could also be based 
on the fear of sanctions, the disclosure of Lavizan-Shian, or the hope of gaining the right 
to enrich through negotiations. It is therefore difficult to decide what argument weights 
the most, and if Iran’s behaviour could be explained through realism or social 
constructivism. Meanwhile, negotiations continued after the Paris Agreement, and on 25 
March 2005 Iran presented a framework for the EU-3 on how Iran could return to 
enrichment activities under monitoring from the IAEA. The EU-3 (probably under 
pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom) declined the Iranian offer. 
According to former British ambassador to the IAEA Peter Jenkins, this refusal made 
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei understand that in reality the EU-3 wanted 
an unlimited suspension of the whole programme, which was unacceptable for Iran 
(Heldal & Heireng 2013). 
 
During the summer of 2005 the United States presented for the IAEA a laptop computer 
containing documents in Farsi (Persian) on how to construct the nose of the Iranian 
Shahab-3 missile in such a manner that it would fit “something round” – implying a 
nuclear implosion warhead (ISIS 2008). Based on this evidence it could appear that Iran 
sought nuclear deterrence. Allegedly the computer had been handed over to American 
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intelligence officials by an Iranian national in Turkey one year earlier, and the content 
suggested that Iran had a secret agenda even after the 2003 agreement. It is possible that 
the evidence was presented in order to affect the scheduled negotiations between the EU-
3 and Iran set to August 2005. The negotiations were initiated by the EU-3, after Iran had 
announced the restart of the conversion activities at the Isfahan facility. However, this 
time Iran declined, and there are five possible reasons for why Iran would do so: Firstly 
Iran would not accept the incentives because the EU-3 could use them against Iran, 
affecting its independence. According to realism, no states accept any authority higher 
than themselves. Secondly Iran’s newly elected president; Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was 
inserted in August 2005. Being a conservative hardliner, Ahmadinejad refused 
cooperation that did not serve Iranian interests, which is also an element in realism. 
Thirdly, Iran’s tougher line towards the EU-3 directly, and the United States indirectly, 
showed that the effect of the Iraq invasion in 2003 probably began to decline, and that 
Iran did not have to compromise so much on behalf of the nuclear programme as before, 
giving the decline its third realist argument. Fourthly, Iran seemed to have reached a 
point where it would not give up on any more rights, as it was affecting the possibility for 
Iran to raise its status. The fifth argument is a bit contradictory to the third, and also a bit 
more speculative. It is possible that the American military presence in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq represented a threat to Iran as the de facto regional power. This could have been 
viewed as an obstacle for Iran’s ambitions of regional power and status, which are 
elements from both realism and social constructivism. And so, if Iran willingly gave up 
its right under the NPT to enrich uranium while the United States continued its hostile 
attitude, this would leave Iran both embarrassed and defenceless. Thus the Iranian 
decision not to give up its enrichment programme seems to be explained by a 
combination of regime change, pride and fear of being defenceless. The decline in August 
2005 therefore marks a distinct effect on the Iranian nuclear programme; going from the 
will to cooperate during Khatami, to the lack of will to cooperate under Ahmadinejad. 
 
As a result of the Iranian decline, EU-3 was forced to withdraw from negotiations, as 
halting the enrichment activities was a requirement from the EU-3 for continued 
negotiations. This led the EU-3 to support IAEA’s next resolution, which opened the case 
for the UNSC. In February 2006 the IAEA took the Iran-case to the UNSC (IAEA 2006), 
and the chance for a constructive solution through the Tehran Statement and the Paris 
Agreement was thereby over.  
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Iran responded by cancelling the implementation of the Additional Protocol (which it had 
agreed upon on 18 December 2003) reducing IAEA’s access to only declared facilities 
(Høibråten et.al. 2013). From this point on, the IAEA’s ability to guarantee a full 
overview of Iran’s nuclear programme deteriorated. With only the Safeguards Agreement 
as a framework, the agency could no longer monitor the “absence of undeclared nuclear 
activities”. Meanwhile, Iran returned to the 180 days interpretation of code 3.1 and 
resumed its uranium enrichment.  In November 2007, the United States National 
Intelligence Estimate stated with “high confidence” that Iran had a nuclear weapons 
programme until the fall of 2003, but that Iran had not restarted the programme by mid-
2007, and with “moderate-to-high confidence” that Iran had no nuclear weapons by 2007 
(NIE 2007).  
 
Iran’s decision to continue its nuclear programme could be explained trough both social 
constructivism and realism, because of the dual use technology within the programme, 
meaning that the production of fissile material could be used for both civil and military 
purposes. It is important to note that no reports suggest that the regime has actually 
developed nuclear weapons or decided to produce weapons grade uranium (over 90%), 
nor separated plutonium (see Appendix A), thus the programme could best be categorized 
as “latent” or “not operational” (Høibråten et.al. 2013, p.95). According to social 
constructivism the nuclear programme plays an important role in the way Iran sees itself: 
the Bushehr nuclear power plant is the first operative nuclear power plant in the Middle 
East, and it signalises both independence and prestige. But while Iran builds on a proud 
civilisation that wants to become a legitimate actor in international affairs, it is a 
significant gap between how Iran sees itself and how others treat Iran. This gap was 
especially evident from the fall of 2003 and till the summer of 2005. Iran received very 
little in return for its transparency and cooperation with the EU-3, and this was blamed on 
Khatami. As a result the conservative Ahmadinejad was elected president, in what can be 
described as a line shift. From this point Iran was less willing to compromise on the 
nuclear issue, because the Iranians were tired of the treatment from the European states, 
and were unwilling to give up their right to peaceful nuclear technology (Lodgaard 2012, 
p.66-71). Analysing through social constructivism, Iran will not give up its right to enrich 
uranium, because that would mean the end of the nuclear programme that plays such an 
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important role when it comes to prestige, self-esteem, status and independence, and also 
the need for electricity (Høibråten et.al. 2013, p.98; Lodgaard 2013). 
 
Although speculative, realism would suggest that Iran withdrew from the negotiations in 
2005 because a permanent suspension of enrichment would halt the production of fissile 
materials for nuclear weapons, or simply because Iran did not trust any agreements with 
Western powers. The suspicion towards possible military dimensions regarding the 
programme is not without reason: On 21 September 2009 the Fordow Fuel Enrichment 
Plant (FFEP) near the city of Qom was revealed. The FFEP brought further suspicion 
because the enrichment plant was constructed inside a mountain hall belonging to the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). With a potential for holding no more than 
3000 centrifuges, the site is unfit for commercial enrichment. In October 2009, the so-
called TRR-agreement (Tehran Research Reactor) was established as a cooperation 
where Iran could deliver 1200 kg of low enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) (see 
Appendix A) (enriched to 19,75%) to Russia, and receive 120 kg of uranium reactor fuel 
(also low enriched) for the TRR. The purpose was to take away the most sensitive 
enriched uranium from Iran, but at the same time enable Iran to use the uranium to 
alleged civilian purposes such as medical isotope production18. Through Iran’s chief 
negotiator Ali Larijani, the country agreed to the terms and was only weeks away from 
signing the agreement when problems occurred. While Larijani was able to get agreement 
on the international level, he was unable at the national level, as the Iranian political 
system was bogged down in institutional rivalries (Lodgaard 2012). Ultimately this made 
the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticise the deal, which in turn resulted in a negative 
Iranian response. Interestingly enough, domestic politics might have contributed to the 
break-down of the TRR-deal. The fact that the TRR-deal failed, could be a possible 
reason for why Iran decided to continue its nuclear programme. 
 
From May 2010 Iran allowed IAEA to conduct inspections in the enrichment facility in 
Natanz twice a month, including one unannounced inspection. The inspectors have had 
access to both the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant 
(PFEP) at Natanz. From May 2010, Iran allowed an additional unannounced visit a month 
as well as a Design Information Verification (DVI) and an Interim Inventory Verification 
                                                          
18 Medical isotopes are produced using a lower power, low cost nuclear reactor which permits the use of all 
the fission products produced in the reactor 
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(IIV). The Inspection frequency in the Iranian enrichment facilities is far higher than the 
production rates would normally imply (Høibråten et.al. 2013, p.98).  Although the 
Iranian cooperation could be explained through liberalism, reality may be that Iran does 
so out of fear, or in case of a secret nuclear weapons programme: keeping IAEA’s 
attention away from clandestine sites. However, Iran would not try to conduct illegal 
activities in facilities inspected regularly. But if a clandestine programme is evident, Iran 
cooperates purely on intentions based on realist theory. The latter view is supported by 
the fact that Iran had refused several of the agency’s inspectors’ access to Iran in recent 
years, forcing IAEA to use inspectors without the desired experience in Iran. This could 
be a strategy to sabotage IAEA’s work, which would be natural if Iran had a clandestine 
nuclear weapons programme, but it could also be explained with Iran’s fear of IAEA 
leaking sensitive information about its prestigious nuclear programme. Regardless, Iran’s 
protective behaviour regarding its nuclear facilities has similarities with the North Korean 
behaviour towards the agency and international inspectors. The IAEA reports quarterly 
on Iran’s technological developments relevant to its implementation of NPT safeguards 
and United Nations Security Council resolutions, addressed from the Director General to 
the Board of Governors. Most member states appreciate these updates; however Iran has 
continuously criticized the IAEA for leaking sensitive information about Iran’s nuclear 
programme. IAEA’s fear is that Iran may have other secret facilities (Høibråten et.al. 
2013, p.98). 
 
In November 2011 the agency issued a report on the implementation of the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement in Iran, containing details on so-called Possible Military 
Dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear programme (IAEA 2011). Basically the issues were 
the same as in 2005, but this time they were described in much more detail. The nuclear 
facility in Parchin (already suspected in 2004) was revealed as a possible site for testing 
of nuclear weapons related technology. International experts’ fear that Iran at some point 
will use an excuse to produce highly enrich uranium, and in 2012 a high-ranking Iranian 
naval officer announced that Iran plans to build nuclear submarines, which would be a 
prefect reason to enrich uranium up to 60-90 %. But this might also be a scare tactic to 
achieve a better “hand” at the next round of negotiations (Høibråten et.al. 2013, 
p.103).The ambition of possessing nuclear submarines has not been confirmed by the 
Supreme Leader or the President. 
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It seems as if Iran in the period after 2005 and until today, has acted more in its own 
interest. This is in contrast to the period after the invasion of Iraq, from 2003 till 2005, 
when Iran acted across its own- interests in order to please the United States. Iran’s 
newfound independence in the time after 2005 could mean that the “Iraq effect” has lost 
its grip, which again could mean that Iran does not fear the United States the same way in 
2013 as it did 10 years ago in 2003. Through the 2013 election of the more reformist 
president Hassan Rouhani, Iran has turned over a new leaf. While the presidency of 
Ahmadinejad was popular for refusing to give up the right to enrichment, the former 
president caused several sanctions on Iran. Under Rouhani Iran wants to end the 
sanctions, but will not drop its nuclear programme until it knows how the “endplay” turns 
out, causing Iran to delay the ratification of the Additional Protocol (Lodgaard 2013). 
Even though Rouhani wants to cooperate with the P5+1 and increase the transparency in 
Iran’s nuclear programme, the new president has expressed that he will not halt Iran’s 
enrichment activities, and this indicates that Iran has not departed from a national strategy 
based on prestige and status. 
5.1.2 Analysis of North Korea’s Nuclear Programme 
Amongst the three states, North Korea is the only one who has taken the full step and 
actually developed nuclear weapons, although there is still no proof that North Korea has 
successfully managed to fit a nuclear device on to a missile, thereby making it a 
“weapon” in the true sense of the word (see Appendix A.2). In reference to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the case of North Korea also differs from Iran and Libya, as North 
Korea had a change of behaviour three months before the invasion. North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the NPT as early as 10 January 2003 suggests that factors other than the 
invasion have played a vital role regarding its nuclear weapon programme. This analysis 
will argue that the Iraq invasion variable in fact did play an important role, along with 
North Koreas national strategy and foreign policy. Further, this analysis will also argue 
that the fear of an invasion was later replaced by a strategy of using the nuclear weapons 
programme as leverage for incentives. 
5.1.2.1 What Caused North Korea to Withdraw From the NPT? 
One important factor that appears to have had an effect on the North Korean nuclear 
programme was the new era in Washington D.C.: In 2000 the bilateral relationship with 
the United States, solidified through the Agreed Framework, was improving, but the new 
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Bush administration entering office in January 2001 viewed the agreement inherited from 
former President Bill Clinton with scepticism. The scepticism was due to two factors: 
The administration’s determination to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear weapon 
related activities, also preventing Iraq, Iran and Libya from acquiring nuclear weapons; 
and the administration’s general expectancy of regime collapse, which had been the case 
for many states left to themselves after the fall of the Soviet Union. As a result of this 
scepticism, the Bush administration ended the common negotiations held with allied 
South Korea, but did not replace them with any new strategy. The combination of the 
new Bush administration, and the terrorist strikes on 11 September 2001 pushed North 
Korea further down on the United States agenda. In the absence of multilateral talks, and 
with an American administration with hostility towards any states supporting terrorism or 
proliferating nuclear weapons, North Korea faced an adversary who seemed to have lost 
its interest in improving the bilateral relationship.  
 
A solid proof of that came in what can be described as a year of hardened critique and 
insults towards North Korea. First the Axis of Evil speech, followed by President Bush’s 
highly personalized criticism of Kim Jong-Il19, and then the public disclosure of North 
Korea’s procurement of equipment and materials for an industrial-scale uranium 
enrichment programme in the summer of 2002 (Kippe 2003; Pollack 2011, p.132). The 
disclosure was similar to the one in Iran (Natanz and Arak), just weeks later. It is likely 
that this convinced the regime that the United States did not want an agreement, but 
rather a regime change. During the fall of 2002 the critique and accusations became 
tougher, as United States Vice Secretary of State James Kelly held diplomatic talks with 
North Korea on 3 to 5 October 2002, presenting proof that the regime had continued its 
enrichment programme. This was seen as a violation of the 1992 agreement, requiring no 
nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, as mentioned in Section 2.4.2, which in turn 
was one of the points in the Agreed Framework. Pyongyang denied, and claimed that the 
United States had failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos. Furthermore, 
the regime stated the following on 25 October 2002:  
 
• The development of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the AF. 
• The United States had “massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in South Korea”. 
                                                          
19 In 2002, President Bush referred to Kim Jong-Il as a “pygmy” and compared him to a “spoiled child at a 
dinner table” during a meeting with Republican senators, according to news reports at the time. 
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• Article I of the AF obliged the United States to provide light water reactors to 
North Korea by 2003, but only site preparations for the reactor had been made 
even though eight years had passed since North Korea froze its nuclear facilities. 
(KCNA 25 October 2002). 
 
Whether the accusations against North Korea were correct or not, the regime was right in 
criticizing the United States for not carrying out the terms of the AF. Also, the conditions 
for the agreement were skewed, as North Korea had to accept inspections of their nuclear 
facilities, but were not allowed to conduct inspections in South Korea to dispel their 
suspicions about American nuclear weapons. Assuming that Pyongyang firmly believed 
that the threat existed, the regime would be living in uncertainty. The fact that uncertainty 
is recognized as an element of realism, where the lack of trust undermines cooperation 
amongst actors, could mean that even though North Korea had cooperated, the 
cooperation had always been considered risky. In the same statement Pyongyang also 
addressed the Axis of Evil phrase: 
 
The Bush administration listed the DPRK as part of the “axis of evil” and a target of the 
U.S. preemptive nuclear strikes. This was a clear declaration of a war against the DPRK 
as it totally nullified the DPRK-U.S. joint statement and agreed framework. […] That 
was why the DPRK made itself very clear to the special envoy of the U.S. President that 
the DPRK was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons, but any type of weapon 
more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the 
ever-growing nuclear threat by the U.S. (KCNA 25 October 2002). 
 
So why would North Korea respond in such a manner? Firstly, North Korea did not 
benefit from the Agreed Framework, and was willing to nullify it for this reason. This 
behaviour strongly correlated with the self-interest realism claims states act according to, 
where states only cooperate if it is vital for security or if it is beneficiary. Clearly it was 
neither. Secondly, North Korea was sufficiently worried about American military 
presence in South Korea, and the unfriendly attitude of the Bush administration, that it 
deemed nuclear weapons as a necessary means of protection. This is a reason in perfect 
sense with neorealist theory, which argues that nuclear weapons are securing the 
possessor from the aggressors and making it possible for weaker states to balance the 
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stronger states. In more general terms it is possible to conclude that both American 
pressure and North Korean national strategy caused the outcome. The fear of sanctions or 
the disclosure of undeclared nuclear activities does not seem to have had any effect in this 
particular case 
 
Although the Bush administration viewed the Agreed Framework with scepticism, as 
mentioned earlier, the complete lack of a dialogue was certainly not preferable. However, 
Washington D.C.’s effort to enable talks consisted once again of using the stick rather 
than the carrot, another factor moving North Korea towards a withdrawal from the NPT. 
And so, in November 2002 the consortium Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
(KEDO) stopped shipments of oil bound for the North, in an attempt to force North 
Korea to comply with the existing non-proliferation agreements under the Agreed 
Framework. Before the regime had responded, a North Korean ship carrying missiles to 
Yemen (a possible transit on the way to Iran or Libya) was intercepted, not making the 
situation any better. By the end of December 2002 the regime responded by denying 
IAEA access to the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, and removing the agency’s 
monitoring equipment: Reactor Two was reopened (allegedly due to power shortage); the 
seals on spent fuel rods containing plutonium were removed; 1000 out of a total of 8000 
stored fuel rods were sent to the reprocessing facility in Yongbyon from other facilities; 
and finally the agency’s inspectors were evicted from North Korea on 31 December 2002 
(Kippe 2003). In this case, it appears that North Korea decided to further develop its 
nuclear programme based on a new foreign policy strategy, rather than the fear of United 
States military presence.  
 
On 10 January 2003 North Korea withdrew from the NPT. Having already addressed 
concerns for its national security and the existence of the state in October 2002, the only 
difference this time was the regime’s reference to NPT’s Article X (see Appendix B.8), 
when stating that the United States posed a nuclear threat to the regime:  
 
Under the grave situation where our state's supreme interests are most seriously 
threatened, the DPRK Government adopts the following decisions to protect the 
sovereignty of the country and the nation and the right to existence and dignity: Firstly, 
the DPRK Government declares an automatic and immediate effectuation of its 
withdrawal from the NPT, on which "it unilaterally announced a moratorium as long as 
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it deemed necessary" according to the June 11, 1993, DPRK-U.S. joint statement, now 
that the U.S. has unilaterally abandoned its commitments to stop nuclear threat and 
renounce hostility towards the DPRK in line with the same statement. […] Though we 
pull out of the NPT, we have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear 
activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production 
of electricity (KCNA 10 January 2003). 
 
As the first member state to ever do so, North Korea withdrew from the NPT it in a 
highly controversial manner, ignoring the 90 days’ notice. According to Pyongyang, the 
first 89 days were already accounted for in 1993, thus North Korea could now withdraw 
with only one day’s notice. Although controversial, this tactic allowed the regime to 
withdraw from an agreement they clearly deemed unfavourable for themselves, before 
anybody could prevent it. The fact that the regime in October 2002 claimed the right to 
possess nuclear weapons, and then months later removed the only legally binding 
agreement hindering this acquirement, paints a grim picture of the path North Korea was 
heading down. And so, claiming no intention to produce nuclear weapons, when at the 
same time admitting a genuine fear of the state’s security, while having a nuclear 
programme with possible military dimensions, is at best contradictory. Yet another 
argument used by the North Koreans to justify their withdrawal was that the IAEA was 
too strongly influenced by the United States and thereby not acting objectively, according 
to the following statement: 
  
IAEA still remains a servant and a spokesman for the U.S. and the NPT is being used as a 
tool for implementing the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK aimed to disarm it and 
destroy its system by force (KCNA 10 January 2003).  
 
The statement shows that the regime had no faith in neutral international organisations 
like the United Nations and the IAEA, which is normal for states that have a realistic 
world-view. The scepticism and trust issue is an element in realism, where an actor can 
only trust and rely on itself.  It is also worth noticing that North Korea, ever since it 
reluctantly signed the NPT in 1985, has never cooperated completely with the IAEA. 
Further, North Korea’s will to cooperate in multilateral forums like the Six-Party talks, 
where the incentives have been quite immediate and concrete, contra the NPT, United 
Nations Security Council and the IAEA shows that North Korea is governed more by 
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self-interest than respect for international agreements, which are both elements 
recognized from realism. 
 
The United States’ accusations towards North Korea seemed to have marked a crossroad 
in Pyongyang’s policy, and by December 2002 the regimes’ patience with peaceful 
cooperation was definitely over. Factors like the failing of the Agreed Framework and the 
Bush administration’s approach caused North Korea to change its foreign policy, and 
thereby also its nuclear programme. Additionally the distrust in international cooperation 
also contributed to the change. North Korea saw that fellow members of the Axis of Evil 
like Iraq, Iran and also Libya, all in compliance with the NPT, were facing massive 
pressure from the United States. Summa summarum: the cost of leaving both the Agreed 
Framework and the NPT was tolerable, clearly thinking in realist terms of costs and 
benefits.  
5.1.2.2 What Caused North Korea to Develop Nuclear Weapons? 
During the early months of 2003, the bilateral relationship between North Korea and the 
United States was ice cold, and the Bush administration persuaded China to calm down 
North Korea while the United States prepared the invasion of Iraq. China briefly curtailed 
oil shipments to Pyongyang in the beginning, but soon deliveries were resumed, and then 
increased (Pollack 2011, p.132). China also had a strong incentive to involve itself in the 
shuttle diplomacy between Washington and Pyongyang, as China feared that an 
escalation of the conflict could bring the United States to their “doorstep” (Pollack 2001, 
p.144). On 12 April 2003, a North Korean official announced that Pyongyang was willing 
to consider any form of dialogue with the United States regarding their alleged nuclear 
weapons programme. There are different possibilities for why the regime would initiate 
such dialogue at this time: Firstly, it is likely that North Korea found itself in a hopeless 
and isolated situation –much like the situation Libya found itself in in early 2000–, and 
were seemingly willing to adjust its foreign policy. If this was the case, then the will to 
cooperate can be explained through liberalism, as openness and dialogue could bring 
North Korea out of isolation. However, the practice of cooperating when Washington 
D.C. cooperates and retaliating when Washington D.C. reneges undermines liberalism, 
and strengthens realism as a possible explanation (Lodgaard 2011, p.152). Secondly, the 
fear of being “next on the list” after Iraq could have caused North Korea to initiate talks 
in order to cool down the situation, and thereby improve its security. This is also a 
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situation quite similar to Libya’s, as will be addressed in section 5.1.3.2. Given the period 
this initiative was presented indicates that the driving force behind the dialogue initiative 
was the Iraq invasion, rather than a change in foreign policy, fear of sanctions or acting in 
terms of liberalism in general. Although speculative, another explanation could be that 
North Korea initiated the negotiations as a strategy to buy time for the development of its 
nuclear weapons programme (a strategy Iran also has been suspected of following). If this 
was the North Korean strategy indeed, the fact that North Korea possessed significantly 
greater conventional forces than Iraq, and was located in the interest sphere of both 
Russia and China could have helped outweigh the fear of an American action (Kippe 
2003).  
 
The North Korean incentive for dialogue was met on 23 April 2003 when talks were held 
in Beijing between the United States, North Korea and China, but no agreement was 
made. In August 2003 another dialogue forum was introduced: the Six-Party talks, (as 
mentioned in Section 1.2). However, divergence between the United States and North 
Korea was evident from the outset, and no agreement was made this time either 
(Lodgaard 2011, p.158). In February 2005 North Korea declared its withdrawal from the 
Six-Party talks, after the United States had applied financial sanctions over the North 
Korean currency (Art 2009). The withdrawal was followed up by a claim that North 
Korea had manufactured nuclear weapons for “self-defence” (Pollack 2011, p.145). This 
indicates that North Korean policy was not affected by the threat and/or use of sanctions, 
but rather that the state used its nuclear weapons programme as a tool for achieving 
incentives; every time negotiations failed, North Korea would take its programme one 
step further.   
 
On 4-5 July 2006 North Korea test-fired seven ballistic20 missiles, and thereby violated a 
self-imposed missile test moratorium tracing back to 1999. The United Nations Security 
Council reacted by adopting Resolution 1695 which criticized North Korea’s behaviour; 
called for multinational sanctions; and for North Korea to return to the Six-Party talks 
and the moratorium. From a North Korean point of view this was discrimination, as states 
like Iran and South Korea could test long-range missiles without interference from the 
UNSC. And so, the counter reaction came three months later on 9 October 2006, when 
                                                          
20 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles 
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North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. This pattern suggests that North Korea 
sought to improve bilateral relations with the United States two times after the invasion 
of Iraq. Both times negotiations failed because the North Koreans would not agree on the 
terms, and this clarifies three important points: Firstly, each time negotiations had failed, 
North Korea had sharpened its rhetoric and taken further steps (statements, missiles, 
nuclear test) towards the development of nuclear weapons. This could be seen as a 
warning signal to the United States that Washington D.C. needed to provide a better 
offer. Secondly, the regime viewed the nuclear weapons programme as too valuable a 
bargaining chip to consider giving it up. And thirdly, the invasion of Iraq had not scared 
the regime to such a level that they were willing to blindly accept all demands posed by 
the United States. Seemingly, the regime was following a dual strategy where the goal 
was to negotiate its way out of isolation, while at the same time secretly developing 
nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to assure the initiative whenever it felt like. This is 
a move quite similar to the one Libya tried to make in 2003 (see Section 5.1.3.3) except 
that North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme was far more successful, thus improving 
the strategy.  
 
All in all, the factors above suggest that North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear 
weapons was due to the collapse of the Agreed Framework, failed attempts to negotiate 
with the new administration in Washington D.C., and the general fear for state security. 
Another interesting fact is that North Korea allegedly sold uranium hexafluoride (see 
Appendix A) to Libya in 2001. At this time North Korea was denying the existence of an 
enrichment programme, but that does not rhyme with its ability to produce and export. If 
this is correct, it serves as another factor undermining the Iraq war’s effect on the North 
Korean decision to develop nuclear weapons. And so, viewed alone the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq does not seem to have had a direct effect on the decision to develop nuclear 
weapons, but the war is indirectly connected to the fear for security, as North Korea 
witnessed what the United States could do to a state in the same situation. Further it is 
worth noticing that the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network in the fall of 2003 does not 
seem to have affected the North Korean decision as it did with Libya (see Section 
5.1.3.2),  and perhaps Iran, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1.1, because the plutonium 
programme was continued without any interruptions, until 2005.  
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But if North Korea had nuclear weapons ambitions already from its nuclear programme 
started in the 1960s, how come the reprocessing of plutonium stopped in 1991 and was 
not resumed until 2003? Or that it stopped in 2007 and was restarted in 2009? – To 
answer these questions it is worth noticing that there are indications that nuclear power 
ambitions have been present since the beginning. This includes the development 
regarding enrichment, given the desire to provide a new research reactor called 
Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) in Yongbyon, for nuclear power fuel. Maybe 
some of the decisions regarding nuclear weapons, especially the Agreed Framework, 
have been partially motivated by the belief in a more efficient establishment of nuclear 
power; in this case the two light water reactors. Finally it is likely that international 
dynamics have dictated the weight ratio between nuclear power and nuclear weapons 
ambitions. 
5.1.2.3 What Does North Korea Want With its Nuclear Weapons? 
North Korea has a complex agenda for its nuclear weapons, where the following can be 
described as the core motives: to deter attack; to build bargaining leverage; to inflate 
crises in order to raise the compensation for defusing them; and to obtain hard currency 
and material favours by exporting nuclear and missile technology (Lodgaard 2011, 
p.156). 
 
North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 might be due to two of the motives above: A 
demonstration to possible aggressors (the United States) that the regime was now in 
possession of a deterrent; and the creation of a crisis which the regime could use to raise 
the compensation for defusing, which was what it did when it accepted an agreement21 
through the Six-Party talks in February 2007. One central condition in this agreement was 
the disablement22 of the plutonium-related facilities at the Yongbyon site. While this 
agreement could seem like a liberalist step towards improving international relations, the 
regime probably agreed to disable because it already had produced enough weapons 
grade plutonium to make a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. Also, the potential cost of 
halting the plutonium production was thus outweighed by the newly verified deterrence, 
                                                          
21 The agreement was essentially the same as in 2005. 
22 The important difference between disablement and dismantlement is that a disablement means that the 
facilities were put out of service in such a manner that it would take time to make them operational again, 
making sure that North Korea would not produce any more plutonium while the talks lasted, while 
dismantlement means destruction, as in irreversible. 
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clearly giving the decision a realist undertone. The test could also have been used to turn 
the United States focus from the Middle East (especially Iraq and Iran) towards the 
Korean peninsula. In other words, North Korea’s new weapon was of such a character 
that it could force the rest of the world to give the regime the wanted attention, enabling 
North Korea to improve international relations in general (breaking out of its isolation), 
and its bilateral relationship towards the United States in special (a security guarantee). 
 
By the fall of 2008 North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement, denying that they 
had allowed inspectors to carry out samplings at their nuclear facilities, stating that 
inspections are limited to field visits, confirmation of documents, and interviews with 
technicians. When the Six-Party talks failed to solve the verification issue, the United 
States halted the heavy fuel oil shipments bound for North Korea. On 5 April 2009 North 
Korea again violated its ballistic missile moratorium, when the three-stage23 space launch 
vehicle Unha-2 was launched. Claiming that the purpose of the missile was of civilian 
character (putting a satellite into orbit), the launch was still in violation of the moratorium 
because the Unha-2 and Uhna-3 are carrier rockets utilizing the same technology as in a 
Taepo-dong-2 ballistic missile. The launch indirectly led to condemnation from the 
United Nations Security Council, because the launch was a violation of resolutions 1695 
and 1718. Further, this led to the final “nail in the coffin” for the Six-Party talks, when 
North Korea withdrew from the diplomatic efforts.  
 
In terms of politics, North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests serve different motives. They 
inflate crises that North Korea can solve, if offered better conditions. But on the other 
hand, if the nuclear devices are to serve as a real deterrent (a weapon in realist terms), it 
is important that the missiles and the devices are developed in such a way that the missile 
can deliver the nuclear device. The missile launches also provide the regime with hard 
currency and material favours when te technology is exported to states like Iran, 
Myanmar and Pakistan. So does the export of nuclear technology to Libya also 
(Høibråten et.al. 2013, p.48-54). 
 
Since the first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has tested on 25 May 2009 and on 12 
February 2013, and the dates are never chosen randomly: The test in 2006 was on 
                                                          
23 A missile with three stages, each with separate engine and propellant. 
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“Columbus Day”, the day Christopher Columbus reached America; the test in 2009 came 
on “Memorial Day”, when the Americans remember their fallen; and the one in 2013 
came hours before President Barack Obama was due to hold his State of the Union 
Address. Clearly the addressee is the United States, because it poses as the greatest threat 
to North Korean security. By using the missile and nuclear programme as a leverage, the 
United States must reluctantly go along with negotiations. During the George W. Bush 
presidency the United States viewed bilateral talks as a way of rewarding the regime, and 
refused to expose itself to “nuclear blackmail” by offering economic or political benefits 
for North Korea to end its nuclear programme. This was one of the reasons why the 
Agreed Framework failed during the Bush administration. The United States did not want 
to reward North Korea for its behaviour, but saw that without negotiations the problem 
grew. For North Korea the situation is challenging: Initially the regime wants to get out 
of the isolation and gain economic assistance just like Libya wanted, but at the same time 
North Korea also wants a security guarantee through diplomatic solutions, as security is 
one of the primary objectives for a state according to realism. But as long as negotiations 
fail, North Korea seeks security through nuclear deterrence. And yet the deterrence serves 
another purpose; nuclear weapons can enable the regime to reduce the costly 
conventional forces so that more money can be spent on the civilian sector. Therefore the 
North Korean leadership seems to have an ambivalent relationship to their nuclear 
weapons, as they clearly function as excellent deterrence and bargaining chips, but at the 
same time keep the country isolated. The 2009 withdrawal from the Six-Party talks, 
where North Korea announced it would never go back, may have had the Agreed 
Framework in mind, as North Korea prefer bilateral talks with the United States, instead 
of multilateral talks where other issues like Japan’s demand for economic compensation 
and return of kidnapped nationals disrupt the process. Additionally the Agreed 
Framework offered much higher economic gains than the Six-Party talks ever offered 
(Lodgaard 2011, p.160). This suggests that the North Korean behaviour regarding its 
nuclear weapons programme is not driven by the same amount of fear of an invasion as it 
was ten years ago, but rather driven by a foreign policy strategy of using the programme 
as leverage for improving conditions.   
5.1.3 Analysis of Libya’s Programme 
The case of Libya marks a distinction from the cases of Iran and North Korea, as Libya 
was the only state to do a nuclear reversal after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But even 
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though all three states must have felt pressured, Libya’s behaviour cannot be solely 
explained as motivated by the invasion. 19 December 2003 marks the end of the Libyan 
nuclear weapons programme, but the question still remains: How much did the 2003 
invasion of Iraq affect the Libyan nuclear weapons programme? This analysis argues that 
the Iraq invasion itself had a smaller effect on the programme, and that Libya’s rollback 
was affected more by sanctions and nuclear technology and activities. 
5.1.3.1 What Caused Libya’s Nuclear Programme to Fail? 
First of all there was an ambivalence towards the pursuit of nuclear weapons nationally 
after al-Qadhafi’s pan-Arabic vision crumbled as Israel started peace talks with the 
Palestinians in the 1990s (Shamir 2013). This situation left the programme without 
political direction. Further, Libya lacked necessary infrastructure as well as indigenous 
expertise in key areas of science and technology. This lack of human resources 
distinguishes Libya’s nuclear programme from Iran’s, and its oil wealth distinguishes it 
from North Korea’s. The combination of money and lack of resources led to attempts to 
simply buy nuclear weapons “off the shelf”, but this failed because no country was 
willing to provide Libya with the finished product or key facilities (Braut-Hegghammer 
2008). Admittedly the connection with the A.Q. Khan network during the mid-1990s 
could have played a pivotal role for the development of the programme as the network 
was supplying technology related to centrifuge enrichment as well as instruction manuals 
on weapons design (Bowen 2008, p.337). Nevertheless, the A.Q. Khan network did not 
turn out to be a reliable partner; it only provided 1.5 of the 20 metric tons of uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6) (see Appendix A) Libya had requested; the centrifuges ordered were 
not in an operable condition; and important information regarding weapons design lacked 
(Bowen 2008, p. 342). It is therefore possible to argue that the lack of sufficient nuclear 
technology, combined with an unreliable partner and a poorly planned and managed 
programme would eventually lead Libya to a crossroads by 2003 when a decision had to 
be made; was the regime aiming to intensify the effort of manufacturing a nuclear 
weapon, or to end an increasingly expensive project? (Braut-Hegghammer 2008).  
5.1.3.2 What Made Libya Willing to Negotiate the Nuclear Weapons Programme? 
Another central factor to the Libyan rollback was the regime’s realisation that the 
sanctions, which effectively isolated Libya from the rest of the world, caused an 
increasing public dissatisfaction. The sanctions weakened the regime politically, 
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strategically and economically, which eventually forced the regime to abandon its nuclear 
weapons programme in return for re-engagement with the outside world (Braut-
Hegghammer 2008). Attempts to approach the United States were taken already during 
President Bill Clinton’s first term (1993-1997) through various Arab interlocutors, but 
this failed (Art 2009). An important first step first came when then assistant secretary of 
State Martin Indyk, met Libyan representatives in May 1999 in Geneva. According to 
Indyk the Libyan representatives officially conveyed the offer to surrender Libya’s 
WMD, but the Clinton administration was more concerned about settling the Lockerbie 
issue, as mentioned in Section 2.4.3, and stopping Libya’s support of terrorism, than it 
was about Libya’s weapons of mass destruction. This was because the chemical and 
biological weapons programmes were not deemed an imminent threat, and the nuclear 
programme had barely begun (Indyk 2004). Between May 1999 and early 2000 there 
were five secret meetings between officials from Libya, the United States and the United 
Kingdom regarding the Lockerbie bombing. These trilateral negotiations created a 
framework and a golden opportunity for Libya to resolve its several decades’ long 
conflict with the United States, which constituted the root cause of the regime’s security 
concerns (Braut-Hegghammer 2009). Given the fact that the Libyan negotiations appears 
to be driven by the work of sanctions, as well as the military threat posed by the United 
States, Libya negotiated because it had no better option, and in that case realism offers 
the best explanation. 
 
When it comes to the United States’ actions after 11 September 200, it is stressed by 
several authors (Shamir 2013; Braut-Hegghammer 2008; Bowen 2008) as vital to the 
rollback, because the actual and potential costs of nuclear weapons pursuit mounted for 
states that were not on good terms with the United States. This is partially true. Just 
months after the events of 11 September 2001 occurred, Libyan diplomats were suddenly 
eager to conduct talks with the United States. The regime may have seen a chance to 
rebrand itself, by sharing intelligence information with the United States and thereby 
potentially improve bilateral relations, but the move was not solely opportunistic, as 
radical Islamitic terrorism was threatening the regime from the inside (Rieker & Braut-
Hegghammer 2012, p.45). Meanwhile, Libya did not abort its nuclear programme; 
instead cascades of 9, 19 and 64 centrifuges installed in the Al Hashan facility were 
moved to the Al Fallah facility for security reasons in the spring of 2002 (Bowen 2008, 
p.341). Given the small cascade sizes, this facility was better suited for a clandestine 
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nuclear weapons programme, and pointless for commercial production of electricity 
which typically would require at least tens of thousands of centrifuges to make a 
difference. The fact that Libya was continuing the nuclear weapons programme 
undermines the relevance of the war on terror, the fear of sanctions and the lack of 
sufficient technical expertise, at this point, and indicates that variables occurring later had 
more decisive effects on the outcome. 
 
But in the same period intelligence services in the United States and the United Kingdom 
had started to intercept the link between the A.Q. Khan network and Libya, and met 
Libya’s proposal with the following demands: Sanctions would not be removed until 
Libya aborted all WMD programmes and the United Nations sanctions, that were 
removed after Libya handed over the two suspects of the Lockerbie bombing, as 
mentioned in Section 2.4.3, could be re-imposed (Braut-Hegghammer 2008). To 
emphasize this demand, on 2 August 2002 former President George W. Bush extended 
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act24 of 1996 for an additional five years after it expired in 
2001. The extension of the act lowered the $40 million investment threshold for possible 
imposition of sanctions to $20 million.  As the War on Terror unfolded and Libya was 
placed in the company of rogue states such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Syria and Cuba, it 
appears that the work of sanctions and the threat of war started to affect the Libyan 
decision making. The fact that Libya now stepped up the effort to negotiate, may be due 
to threats to national security.  
 
Having first played a vital role in the Lockerbie negotiations, the United Kingdom was 
also a key factor in the trilateral nuclear weapons negotiations that followed in the spring 
of 2003. Amongst the Libyan negotiators that met with British intelligence in March 
2003 trying to re-establish Libya’s international relations was also al-Qadhafi’s son Saef 
al-Islam, who was assumed to have a moderating influence on al-Qadhafi (Bowen 2008, 
p.346). Although the decision on the nuclear weapons issue would probably have been 
inevitable, as it was an American requirement, the timing of the Libyan initiative is 
interesting. It suggests that the invasion of Iraq was a final nail in the Libyan nuclear 
weapons coffin, but also that it was not the sole or most salient reason for the outcome. 
                                                          
24 In 1996 The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was a United States Congressional act that imposed 
economic sanctions on firms doing business with Iran and Libya, for five years at a time: 1996-2001-2006 
(Shamir 2013). 
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Instead, it appears that the work of sanctions might have contributed the most.  In the 
beginning of 2003, the unemployment level was at 30 % due to decades of internal 
mismanagement and sanctions affecting especially the highly dependable oil industry. 
Albeit United Nations and some European sanctions were lifted after the Lockerbie 
resolution, the increasingly influential Saef al-Islam and other reform friendly technocrats 
made al-Qadhafi realize that American investments were needed to help revitalize and 
modernize the oil industry, in order to reach target levels. The fact that Libya’s oil 
production was halved from the 1970 level, that it accounted for 95 % of exports and 70-
80 % of government revenues tell what an “Achilles heel” the oil industry was for the al-
Qadhafi regime (Shamir 2013). 
5.1.3.3 What Caused Libya to Conduct a Nuclear Rollback? 
The trilateral negotiations in late 2003 ultimately became a success because it involved 
the same small number of individuals in all talks from 1999 to 2003, rather than large 
bureaucracies and international organizations. These negotiators were therefore able to 
separate the people from the problem, building trust through diplomacy and personal 
relationships. Under these circumstances the negotiators were able to identify interests, to 
which they presented mutually acceptable criteria, creating a win-win solution rather than 
a one-way street (Rieker & Braut-Hegghammer 2012, p.47). A factor of particular 
importance for al-Qadhafi and his inner circle was the realization that Washington did not 
pursue regime change, thus providing a face-saving way out of the nuclear weapons 
project. Trust and diplomacy are elements from Liberalism, where dialogue is assumed to 
improve international relations, which means that the regime was not only motivated by 
terms of realism.  
  
According to Shamir (2013), Bowen (2008, p.352) and Braut-Hegghammer (2009), the 
combination of sticks and carrots was essential to the success of the trilateral 
negotiations. Although this may be correct, it is important to notice that the turnaround 
came when the peak of the sanctions had already passed, in a period of systemic 
continuity (Lodgaard 2011, p.125). The BBC China incident in October 2003, as 
mentioned in Footnote 8, undermines both the importance of the invasion of Iraq and the 
sanctions, as it happened during negotiations months later. It is therefore likely that Libya 
by October 2003, was either still pursuing nuclear weapons, or at least ensuring a strong 
bargaining hand. The fact that Libya managed to develop a uranium conversion facility, 
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successfully test its centrifuges and acquire ballistic missiles from North Korea before the 
disarmament, could potentially back both theories. However, the seizure of BBC China, 
seems to have drawn the line for both a real nuclear weapons option and a strong 
bargaining hand. Firstly, it demonstrated for the al-Qadhafi regime that American and 
European intelligence had detailed knowledge about Libya’s nuclear procurement 
activities (Bowen 2008, p.347). Secondly, during the search through the cargo of the BBC 
China it appears that investigators overlooked and failed to remove one crate of 
centrifuge parts before the ship was allowed to sail on to Libya. Whether this was to test 
Libya’s honesty or simply a mistake made by the inspectors, it worked. The fact that 
Libya instantly alerted the United States and the United Kingdom about the forgotten 
centrifuges (Breivik & Toft 2007), and also invited inspectors over to visit the sites 
associated with its WMD programmes shows that Libya was fully committed to comply. 
Apparently the disclosure of Libya’s undeclared activity was an important variable, and it 
seems to have been much more influential than the invasion of Iraq.  
 
The quick reversal on 19 December 2003 (six days after the capture of Saddam Hussain) 
can be explained through the structure of the Libyan regime. Contrary to Saddam 
Hussain’s decision to increase the collaboration with the United Nations inspectors in late 
2002, al-Qadhafi’s decision to abandon the nuclear weapons project was effective within 
days, due to the nature of his leadership (Rieker & Braut-Hegghammer 2012, p.46). 
Additionally, the general consensus amongst Libyan officials was that the possession of 
nuclear weapons would generate insecurity instead of security and thus no longer being in 
the interest of the regime. It is therefore likely that a change in national strategy in order 
to increase security, was also an affecting variable (Bowen 2008, p.347).  
 
Libya’s rollback is noteworthy because it did not follow from a regime change or a large-
scale domestic political transition. The pursuit of what had initially been an affordable 
luxury seemed less appealing, and the regime felt compelled to abort its nuclear weapons 
programme, as it was facing a two-level crisis: The nuclear weapons project clearly 
affected the regime’s internal standing as its expenses combined with the sanctions were 
affecting development in all other sectors; but it was also leading towards the possible 
external threat of an intervention which could topple the regime. According to realism, 
the security of the state and the regime is vital. Thus, Libya shifted from power to 
economic growth and welfare, as a strategy to keep the regime in power (Braut-
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Hegghammer 2009). Like de Klerk’s South Africa, al-Qadhafi exchanged the nuclear 
weapons programme with normalized relations with the United States and the 
international community – quite similar to what North Korea says it would be willing to 
do, on and off, without any change of government. Ironically, the nuclear weapons 
project held the key to the regime’s security and survival.  
 
So what effect did the United States’ invasion of Iraq have on Libya’s nuclear weapons 
programme? One view is that the invasion of Iraq concentrated al-Qadhafi’s mind. 
Another view points towards the implicit assurances which the Bush administration gave 
to al-Qadhafi, that behavioural change would ensure regime survival, and that this 
eventually persuaded al-Qadhafi to close the nuclear weapons programme. The truth is 
probably a combination of these two views. 
 
The motivation for rollback is best explained through realism, as the regime’s security 
and survival from internal and external threats was important. Having failed to gain 
security through alliance in both the Arabic and the African communities, Libya sought a 
stronger platform by embarking on a nuclear weapons programme. When the programme 
did not pay off, it was dropped in exchange for reassured acceptance by the United States 
and the European states. It is also possible to argue that Libya’s attempt to participate and 
improve relations with the outside world could be explained through liberalism, but if the 
regime felt compelled for security reasons to do so, it would undermine the liberalistic 
motive. Social constructivism cannot provide an explanation for the reversal, but in the 
aftermath, the reversal gave the regime a moral high ground, which is important in social 
constructivism. This was exemplified by al-Qadhafi’s 2004 call upon all states to 
abandon their WMD programmes, stating that nuclear weapons made states less secure 
(Arms Control Association 2013a). However, Libya was advocating non-proliferation 
after being caught pants down, and conducted a reversal partially out of fear of the 
consequences, which undermines the social constructivist argument, and enforces the 
realist argument. 
5.2 Comparative Analysis 
Having first analysed each case by itself, this part of the analysis will compare all three 
cases in order to identify the similarities and differences. This part of the analysis aims at 
investigating what effect the invasion of Iraq could have had on all three cases.  
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5.2.1 Before the Invasion of Iraq 
Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, all three states had a history of nuclear weapons 
ambitions, with North Korea going back to the late 1950s, Libya to the early 1970s and 
Iran to the mid-1970s. All three states’ ambitions for having a nuclear weapons 
programme appears to be reasoned with either deterrence, which is an element in 
defensive realism, or prestige and status, which are elements in social constructivism. But 
at the same time Iran and North Korea (to a lesser extent) also wanted to be self-supplied 
with nuclear power, and sought to develop facilities related to the production of nuclear 
energy. Libya on the other hand, had ambitions about a leading role in the Arab world, 
and viewed nuclear weapons as a short cut to this role. Unlike Iran and North Korea, 
Libya appears to have had no interest in nuclear energy.  
 
When the Bush administration entered office in 2001, all three states already had a frayed 
relationship with the United States because of their nuclear programmes, which all were 
suspected of having possible military dimensions. However, the way the different nuclear 
programmes were effected, changed from here on out. The 11 September 2001 attacks, 
and the following War on Terror appears to have given Libya further incentive to re-
evaluate its nuclear programme, because of the increased costs of its nuclear weapons 
pursuit, thereby linking the effect of the War on Terror to realism. At the same time it is 
likely that North Korea felt the need to develop its nuclear weapons programme further, 
in order to retrieve the attention it had recently lost to the Middle East, because of the 
Bush administration’s focus on Saddam Hussein’s alleged WMD in Iraq. Iran and its 
nuclear programme appears to have been the one least affected in this particular period. 
 
In 2002 and 2003, the three members of the Axis of Evil witnessed how Iraq, a fellow 
member, went from being accused of having a nuclear weapons programme, to being 
invaded by the United States’ lead coalition months later. Viewed from the side line, the 
mounting pressure on Iraq appears to have affected the other states’ security concerns, 
which were closely linked to their nuclear programmes. North Korea’s decision to 
withdraw from the NPT appears to have been affected by the pressure building up, and 
Pyongyang seemingly saw the need for a nuclear deterrent as imminent. Iran, on the other 
hand, invited IAEA to conduct inspections, most likely to take some of the edge off its 
nuclear programme. Both the sudden need for a deterrent and the somewhat reluctant 
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cooperation could be linked to realism, as ways of ensuring national security. Contrary to 
the two others, Libya was already negotiating its nuclear programme secretly with the 
United States and the United Kingdom, a process that was more likely driven by a 
combination of fear, related to realism, and optimism, related to liberalism.  
5.2.2 Possible Short Term Effects of the Invasion of Iraq 
One of the first effects of the 2003 invasion of Iraq was that eventually all three regimes 
wanted bilateral talks with the United States, regarding their nuclear programmes. 
However, the will to negotiate seemed motivated by different factors. Sanctions appear to 
have had an effect on Iran and Libya. In the case of Libya, the will to negotiate is likely 
to stem from the work of sanctions, while in the case of Iran, the fear of having sanctions 
imposed might have affected the Iranians to initiate negotiations regarding their nuclear 
programme. North Korea on the other hand is less likely to have been affected by the 
threat or work of sanctions. 
 
Instead, North Korea appears to have been significantly more affected by the invasion of 
Iraq. One theory in support of this is that North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 
because it did not believe that the United States would attack Iraq, and when it witnessed 
that the United States actually did attack, it changed policy regarding its nuclear 
programme. Either way, realism appears to have the best theoretical explanation, as fear 
once again was the rationale behind North Korea’s choice. When it comes to Iran, it is 
likely that the Iraq invasion had a significant effect on its will to negotiate. But it was not 
just the fear of being invaded. The American regional military presence, the membership 
in the Axis of Evil, and the fear of forced regime change were all part of this effective 
variable. Libya also appears to have been affected by this variable, but to a lesser degree 
than Iran. It is possible that this was due to its geographical location, where Libya did not 
face any American regional presence.  
 
It is also worth noticing a difference in the attempts to negotiate right after the invasion of 
Iraq: While Libya and North Korea was allowed a dialogue in the spring of 2003, Iran 
was refused. Why? A possible explanation could be that American intelligence 
organisations knew enough about Iran’s progress regarding possible military dimensions 
to deem it less urgent than North Korea, or that it was due to the lack of diplomatic ties 
since 1979. Libya on the other hand, was invited to the negotiating table because 
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negotiations had been on-going since the late 1990s, and the Libyans seamed closer to 
conduct a nuclear turnaround. In other words, it was worth negotiating.  
 
Further, all three programmes appear to have been used as bargaining chips to different 
levels. While Libya was about to cancel their programme, an important reason for giving 
it up was the chance for increased security and regime survival, a concern possibly 
influenced by the Iraq invasion. As mentioned earlier, it is possible that North Korea 
withdrew from the NPT in order to develop its nuclear programme further, so it could be 
used as a bargaining chip. While the rationale behind Libya’s and North Korea’s 
behaviour is best explained through realism, Iran’s reasons for negotiating its nuclear 
programme could also be explained through social constructivism. Iran was, as 
mentioned earlier, affected by the invasion of Iraq, but it was also driven by a foreign 
policy goal, where a peaceful nuclear programme could provide Iran with pride and 
status. This goal appears to have been strong enough to leave the subject of enrichment 
out of the Iranian proposal, while the dual-use aspect functioned as Iran’s bargaining 
chip.  
 
Seemingly, all three states wanted to normalize the bilateral relationship with the United 
States (this was also a prioritized demand when Iran proposed a deal for the United States 
in May), but the difference was that North Korea and Libya were willing to give up their 
entire programmes. During the Six-Party talks in late August 2003, North Korea stated 
that it would dismantle its nuclear facilities and end its missile testing and export of 
missiles and related components, if the United States concluded on a “non-aggression 
treaty”, completed the reactors promised under the Agreed Framework, resumed 
suspended fuel oil shipments, and increased food aid (Arms Control Association 2013c). 
In general it appears that the invasion of Iraq had affected Libya and North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons programmes in such a way, that they were “for sale if the price was 
right”. The difference between the three programmes was that Libya and North Korea 
had stated intentions or ambitions about the acquirement of nuclear weapons, and their 
programmes were therefore viewed accordingly. From a realist perspective, these 
programmes could be given up, if security was provided. The doubt about security is 
likely to come off the invasion of Iraq. For Iran the case was different, and one must turn 
to social constructivism to understand why Iran was not willing to offer the programme 
for an enhanced chance for security, like the two others. The Iranian programme was first 
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and foremost a prestige project aimed at providing the Islamic republic with nuclear 
energy, a right Iran referred to through the NPT. This suggests that Iran’s national 
strategy and foreign policy goals, balanced the negative effects of the fear of sanctions, 
and the invasion of Iraq, thereby making it a significantly strong variable.  
 
For Libya, the negotiations acted out differently because the Libyans had wanted to 
address the nuclear weapons issue since 1999, and were allowed to once the Lockerbie 
tangle had been solved. While the invasion of Iraq affected the Libyan outcome to some 
point, the disclosure of the A.Q Khan network, as mentioned in Footnote 7, through the 
seizure of the BBC China appears to have affected the outcome of the Libyan nuclear 
programme. This is in contrast to Iran which seemed less affected by the disclosure, and 
North Korea which did not appear to be affected at all. Another variable affecting the 
programmes differently was the access to relevant nuclear technology and expertise. It 
appears that Libya differs from Iran and North Korea at this specific point, because it did 
not have the same level of national nuclear expertise as the others. 
5.2.3 Possible Long Term Effects of the Invasion of Iraq 
One significant difference between Libya’s programme and the two others is that the 
other programmes continued after 2003, possibly giving the different variables further 
and more long lasting effects on the remaining programmes. 
 
The NIE of 2007 states that “international scrutiny and pressure” were instrumental in the 
decision to halt Iran’s enrichment programme in 2003 (NIE 2007), indicating that the 
threat of war, as well as the threat of sanctions affected Iran’s nuclear programme. 
However, the long-lasting effect of the invasion is rather unclear. Seemingly Iran and 
North Korea adapted differently in the aftermath of the war. Iran might have feared that 
the lack of cooperation regarding its enrichment activities could lead to sanctions or 
military action through a resolution from the UNSC or as a comprehensive counter-
proliferation measure taken by the United States, whereas the war in Iraq was a 
continuous reminder of the latter. Either way, realism serves as the most influential 
rationale behind the halt, while liberalism could possibly argue that the halt was an 
Iranian attempt to gain support for its uranium enrichment through diplomacy. 
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North Korea’s strategy of using threats in order to be compensated was evident from the 
early 1990s, but the threats usually concerned compliance with the NTP or missile 
moratoriums. From the fall of 2003 North Korea went further, and on 6 November 2003 
the North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ri Yong Ho, told the news agency 
Reuters that North Korea “possessed a workable nuclear device” (Arms Control 
Association 2013c). It is likely that the Iraq invasion affected North Korea to “step up” 
the threats regarding its nuclear programme, and in the terms of defensive realism North 
Korea needed to show the United States that it was in fact not bluffing, by presenting 
evidence of deterrence. And so, on 8 January 2004 an American delegation was invited to 
the Yongbyon facility to witness what North Korea referred to as its “nuclear deterrent”. 
Of especial importance was the testimony of Siegried Hecker, a former director at the 
United States Los Alamos National Laboratory25. Hecker was used to confirm the 
realness of the North Korean threat, in order to stop any doubts that potentially could 
have led to a comprehensive attack by the United States. It is therefore also possible to 
assume that the Iraq invasion speeded up the North Korean nuclear programme after 
2003, so a deterrent could be presented before North Korea came under attack. 
Simultaneously this transparency could also be influenced by North Korea’s foreign 
policy strategy, in which the nuclear programme was used as leverage. Whether the 
decision to show the Americans the Yongbyon facility was due to the Iraq invasion or 
due to the strategy is hard to determine.       
 
After 2005 it is harder to determine whether the 2003 invasion of Iraq still affected the 
nuclear programmes in Iran and North Korea, but North Korea’s withdrawal from the 
Six-Party talks, and Iran’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement suggest that the effect 
was decreasing.  
 
Iran’s decision to start enrichment in 2005 and cancelling the implementation of the 
Additional Protocol in 2006 are both actions that confirm the line shift represented by 
Ahmadinejad. A possible interpretation is that until 2005, Iran’s nuclear program seamed 
affected more by realism through the fear of being next on the list after Iraq and the fear 
of sanctions, but after 2005 the program seemed to be affected more by a social 
constructivist policy, where Iranian foreign policy was more focused on prestige and 
                                                          
25 Los Alamos National Laboratory is one of two laboratories in the United States where classified work 
towards the design of nuclear weapons is undertaken. 
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status through the nuclear programme. Together with North Korea’s decision to conduct 
its first nuclear test on 9 October 2006, these are actions that occurred after a long series 
of events, in which the Iraq invasion is just one of many. It is therefore impossible to 
determine for certain if the invasion of Iraq affected these turnouts, but it is reasonable to 
assume that both Iran and North Korea acted with the war in Iraq as a reminder.  
5.2.4 Sanctions and Foreign Policy Affecting the Nuclear Programmes 
Although the fear of being next on the list has decreased, thereby not affecting the 
nuclear programmes in Iran and North Korea, other factors might continue to affect the 
nuclear programmes. For instance, the threat and work of sanctions have had an indirect 
effect on the nuclear programme, by affecting Iranian politics. Like the line shift from 
Khatami to Ahmadinejad in 2005, the Supreme Leader Khamenei let the more liberal 
Hassan Rouhani become president in the 2013 election. If the line change is due to the 
effect of economic sanctions, it means that Supreme Leader Khamenei faces domestic 
pressure, and the only way to solve it is through a new international approach. Since his 
inauguration as president in August 2013, Rouhani has stated that Iran is willing to 
participate in new talks regarding their nuclear programme, but by October 2013 an 
agreement is yet to be concluded. In the case of North Korea, sanctions have been 
imposed after missile testing in July 2006 and April 2009, and North Korea answered the 
sanctions by conducting a nuclear test on 12 February 2013. This “choreography” has 
repeated itself from 2006 to 2009 and 2013 (Lodgaard 2013). This could indicate that 
North Korea is not affected by sanctions in the same way as Iran is. When it comes to 
national strategy and foreign policy, both Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes 
appears to have been increasingly affected by this variable in the years after the invasion 
of Iraq. In the case of Iran, the nuclear programme appears be important for prestige and 
status, thereby connecting it to social constructivism. In the case of North Korea, the 
programme serves more as a strategic tool the regime can use to gain incentives, and is 
therefore best explained through realism, where states always act according to their own 
interests. Nuclear technology appears to have a lesser effect on both remaining nuclear 
programmes, as they appear no longer to be in need of assistance, such as the Khan 
network. It is also uncertain whether the disclosure of nuclear activities has a strong 
effect on any of the programmes today.  
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5.2.5 Other Variables Potentially Affecting the Nuclear Programmes  
In the case of Iran, other measures has been tried in order to hinder its nuclear 
programme: assassinations of nuclear scientists as well as cyber weapons26 have been 
used, by unidentified actors, to cripple the nuclear programme (Lodgaard 2012), but 
according to Høibråten et.al. (2013) there is little evidence that this has had any 
significant effect on the technological process on the ground. Although a bit more 
speculative, a final factor that could have had an effect on Iran’s and North Korea’s 
nuclear programmes is the attack on Libya in 2011, which is connected to American 
influence and fear of the United States military. Libya was attacked after willingly giving 
up their nuclear programme, something that hardly went unnoticed in Pyongyang or 
Tehran. While Tehran was more balanced in its critique of the military action against 
Libya, Pyongyang clearly viewed it differently: 
 
the U.S sparked a fresh war disaster in order to bring about regime change […] It was 
fully exposed to the world that “Libya’s nuclear dismantlement” much touted by the U.S 
in the past turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby the latter coaxed the former 
with such sweet words as “guarantee of security” and “improvement of relations” to 
disarm itself and then swallowed it up by force […] It proved once again the truth of 
history that peace can be preserved only when one builds up one’s own strength as long 
as high-handed and arbitrary practices go on in the world (KCNA 22 March 2011). 
 
Once again a member of the Axis of Evil was attacked by an American led intervention, 
and once again the result was regime change. For Iran and North Korea the lesson is that 
two out of four states suspected of having nuclear weapons programmes, have been 
attacked, and that none of them had any nuclear deterrence to use. To Pyongyang this fact 
is likely to increase the value of their nuclear weapons, and to Tehran this fact must be 
alarming; both these effects have a clear link to realism. However, it is hard to determine 
whether the attack on Libya had any actual effect on the nuclear programmes.    
                                                          
26 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-
iran.html?_r=0 
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5.2.6 Reflections 
Iran seems determined to preserve for itself the option of acquiring a nuclear-weapons 
capability at some future date. Often described as a nuclear latency state27, Iran probably 
wants to shorten the time it would take to build these weapons. Until Iran has all 
necessary infrastructure and the needed fissile material at its disposal the membership in 
the NPT gives its nuclear programme the necessary “shelter” from the international non-
proliferation pressure. In other words, the rights given by Article IV pushes Iran to the 
limit of what is accepted regarding Article II, making the road to nuclear weapons 
shorter. This is an inherent destabilising quality of the NPT as a result of the rather 
unspecific Articles I, II and IV (see Appendix A) (Høibråten et.al. 2013). Iran’s move 
towards this latency could be due to the persisting fear of American military presence, 
and in that case, realism would offer the best explanation. But, Iran could also pursue 
nuclear weapons as part of its national strategy and its foreign policy, and this would best 
be described as acting according to social constructivist theory. Iran finds itself in a state 
of disequilibrium, where nuclear weapons could provide regional prestige and power. 
The strategy Iran follows has similarities to the one North Korea followed prior to its 
nuclear breakout. But now that North Korea already possesses a nuclear deterrent, much 
of the tension regarding its programme is related to North Korea’s next move. Where Iran 
might be described as having a nuclear energy programme with a weapons option, North 
Korea could be described as having a nuclear weapons programme, with an energy 
option.  North Korea first tried to obtain light water reactors from the Soviet Union, then 
through the Agreed Framework, and now they are trying to build light water reactors by 
themselves. By doing so, North Korea will soon find itself on the same ground as Iran; 
having an enrichment programme with a dual use aspect. What separates North Korea 
from Iran is that North Korea already has a workable nuclear device, which serves as a 
deterrent (Lodgaard 2013). But even if North Korea’s main interest is nuclear power, 
there is reason to worry. International experts believe that the nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 
and 2013 were plutonium bombs. North Korea abandoned its plutonium production in 
2006, and it is not known whether the uranium enrichment programme is for research or 
military use, or even if it is running at all. But, if North Korea were to switch from 
plutonium to uranium as weapons material, it would enable Pyongyang to greatly expand 
                                                          
27 A state that has the infrastructure to produce fissile materials of weapons grade, without doing so, 
exemplified by Japan and Germany. Today, Iran can also be placed in this category because of its 
capabilities (Sagan 2010, p. 80-101). 
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its arsenal (Dahl 2013). In a statement from April 2013, North Korea stated that it would 
develop its nuclear arsenal both qualitatively and quantitatively, and that this was non-
negotiable (Lodgaard 2013). As for the policy, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un will 
not accept the starvation and poverty of his people. Therefore, nuclear weapons have 
acquired a new role in his strategic plan. His father traded the nuclear programme for 
food and oil, under the Agreed Framework. Kim Jong-un appears to have another plan: to 
use the threat of nuclear weapons to gain as many needed resources as possible. And this 
plan works, for now. And as long as it works, the regime will most likely be very 
reluctant to give up nuclear weapons, their value is too high (Petersson 2013).  
5.3 Summary 
5.3.1 The Individual Nuclear Programmes 
Based on the analysis above, this section will identify the most influential variables in the 
three cases separately.    
 
In the case of Iran, several variables could have affected the decision to halt parts of the 
nuclear programme: Former President Khatami’s diplomatic approach could have had an 
effect, but it is more likely that the Khatami acted in such manners because he feared 
sanctions. The sanctions variable appears to have been balanced by the temptation of 
technological achievements Iran could gain through the activities in Natanz and Arak, but 
once the facilities were disclosed, Iran might have feared it could lead to sanctions, 
thereby increasing the effect of this variable. Prior to the invasion were also variables like 
the War on Terror, and the Axis of Evil which arguably increased the pressure on Iran. 
However, the effect of these variables appears to have been weak before the invasion. 
Once the Iraq invasion was a fact, it appears to have taken some time before the variable 
affected the Iranian nuclear programme, as a variable like national pride made Iran 
reluctant to halt the enrichment at first. Nevertheless, the effect of the Iraq invasion 
appears to have increased when the United States refused dialogue, and Iran had to 
negotiate with the EU-3. And so did the fear of sanctions, because failure in negotiations 
could also lead to a referral to the UNSC by the IAEA Board of Governors, which could 
impose sanctions. Other variables that could have affected the outcome, was the removal 
of Iran’s regional enemies, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, but 
these variables were levelled out by the American regional presence they led to, which 
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only increased the effect of the Iraq invasion. Also the Tehran Statement appears to have 
had some effect on the outcome on the halt, because Iran was led to believe that the 
suspension of gas into the centrifuges were sufficient. A more speculative variable is the 
theory that Iran already had mad so much progress on the non-nuclear components of the 
nuclear weapons that halting the programme would be of little importance but it is 
impossible to argue for this variable as long as Iran’s nuclear programme has a dual-use 
aspect. The disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network did at best support the effect of the Iraq 
invasion or the sanctions variable, but does not appear to have contributed significantly 
itself.   
 
There are also several variables that could have caused Iran to continue its nuclear 
programme. The failure of the Paris Agreement might have had an effect, and the 
realisation that the American regional presence was threatening Iran as de facto regional 
power could also have contributed. Still what appears to have affected the decision to 
continue the nuclear programme most, was the argument over suspending enrichment, 
and the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President in 2005. The Iranian line change 
appears to have undermined variables like the fear of sanctions and the Iraq invasion, 
with variables like prestige, status and independence. It is also possible that the nuclear 
programme was continued as a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, affected by the 
Iraq invasion. 
 
In the case of North Korea several variables could have affected the decision to withdraw 
from the NPT. The new policy of the Bush administration, and the way it treated North 
Korea with the Axis of Evil, and the hardened critique of Kim Jong-il seemingly led to the 
collapse of the Agreed Framework, which appears to have had a significant effect on the 
North Korean decision to withdraw. Another variable that could have contributed to the 
outcome were the stopping of KEDO-shipments with oil in the fall of 2002, but this was 
related to the collapse of the Agreed Framework, and did probably not affect the outcome 
much by itself. However, the American regional presence in South Korea, where North 
Korea believed the United States had stationed nuclear weapons (even though the United 
States claimed that they withdrew nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1992), in 
combination with the more hostile Bush administration might have influenced the 
decision to withdraw. But perhaps a more influential variable was the distrust in 
international cooperation, as North Korea witnessed how members of the NPT became 
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victims of increasing pressure from the United States. There are also several variables 
that could have led North Korea to continue develop nuclear weapons. The Iraq invasion 
appears to have had a strong effect on the programme in the period right after the 
invasion, much due to the increasing pressure on the remaining member of the Axis of 
Evil. However, the effect of the Iraq invasion appears to have decreased within the same 
year as the effect increased on Iran. In 2005 North Korea withdrew from the Six-Party 
talks in February 2005, claiming that it had developed a nuclear deterrent. This could 
indicate that North Korea’s nuclear programme, form here on, were less influenced by the 
Iraq invasion, more affected by the national strategy and foreign policy variable, as the 
regime understood that it could use the nuclear weapons programme a bargaining chip. 
 
In the case of Libya, several variables could have affected the decision to terminate its 
nuclear weapons programme. Firstly, the lack of sufficient national technical expertise 
appears to have been an important variable. Secondly, the trade with the A.Q. Khan 
network did not provide Libya with the materials it needed, but the importance of this 
variable is undermined by the fact that it did not stop Libya’s pursuit. However, the 
disclosure of the very same network through the BBC China had a strong influence on the 
decision to terminate the nuclear weapons programme. Further, the Lockerbie 
Negotiation was also an important variable. It was important because the negotiation 
made Libya realise that the United States did not want regime change, and because the 
negotiations that led to the nuclear reversal were led by the same people. Further, the 
work of sanctions had a significant effect on the nuclear turnaround, as the sanctions had 
crippled the Libyan economy for several decades, making the regime desperate for a 
solution. The Iraq invasion might have contributed, but given all the other variables, it is 
not given that it caused the effect.  
5.3.2 Comparative Summary 
Amongst the most effective variables was the Iraq invasion. It appears to have had an 
effect on all three programmes, but while it remained strong in the cases of Iran and 
North Korea, it is harder to determine its strength in the case of Libya. However, the 
sanctions variable appears to be easier to link to the Libyan decision, as the work of 
sanctions had a significant effect. The sanctions variable also appears to have had an 
effect on the Iranian decision to halt the enrichment, while it appears to have had no 
effect on the North Korean nuclear programme. North Korea, however, appears to have 
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been gradually affected by the national strategy and foreign policy variable, along with 
Iran. For Libya, this variable does not appear to have had any significant effect. When it 
comes to the nuclear technology options and activities variable, it appears to have 
affected the Libyan decision the most, while Iran and North Korea does not appear to 
have been affected significantly. Other variables like the Axis of Evil appear to only have 
affected North Korea significantly, while Libya and Iran appears to have remained 
unaffected. The trade with the A.Q. Khan network appears to have affected Libya’s 
decision significantly, and it might have affected Iran’s. North Korea appears to remain 
unaffected by the variable.  
 
The international relations theories used in this research have to a different degree proven 
useful. In terms of liberalism, all three states have cooperated as some point, but 
liberalism as an explanation is undermined by the fact that the cooperation was due to 
fear of consequences. Although useful to show the undermining, liberalism as an 
international relations theory has contributed less to this research than the two other 
theories. As the knowledge about the internal factors in North Korea is limited, the 
actions taken by the regime has been explained mainly by external factors. Therefore 
realism has been the perfect choice in analysing North Korea’s decision to withdraw from 
the NPT, and eventually develop nuclear weapons. As for Libya, realism also here serves 
as the best capable theory to explain the rollback. Finally, Iran’s behaviour appears to be 
a hybrid of realism and social constructivism. 
6 Conclusions  
This research has investigated the possible effects of the 2003 invasion of Iraq on the 
nuclear programmes in Iran, North Korea and Libya. The assumption of this research was 
that changes in the nuclear programmes did occur in 2003, and that the invasion of Iraq 
might have been the reason. The goal of this research has therefore been to clarify to what 
degree the 2003 invasion of Iraq affected the outcome of the changes in the nuclear 
programmes. This research assumed that the 2003 invasion of Iraq contributed to Iran’s 
halt in enrichment, Libya’s rollback and North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT. 
 
After having conducted both separate and comparative analysis, the assessment of this 
research is the following: Iran appears to have halted its enrichment primarily because the 
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regime saw the risk of conducting nuclear enrichment after witnessing the Iraq invasion, 
but also because it feared that sanctions could be imposed, and because the Tehran 
Agreement led Iran to believe that the suspension of gas was sufficient. Further it appears 
that the fear represented by the Iraq invasion decreased in 2005 when Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad was elected president, and the fear was replaced by a much more 
independent behaviour, aiming for prestige and status. The realisation that EU-3 and the 
United States wanted a permanent suspension of enrichment appears to have had 
significant effect on the decision to continue the enrichment programme. The dual-use 
aspect of the Iranian nuclear programme also makes it possible that a driving force 
behind the continued development was motivated by nuclear weapons ambitions.  It is 
furthermore the assessment of this research that Iran’s decisions could first be described 
through realism until 2005, and after 2005 in combination with social constructivism. 
 
North Korea appears to have withdrawn from the NPT primarily because of the pressure 
building up before the Iraq invasion, but also because of the collapse of the Agreed 
Framework, and the distrust in international cooperation. Further, it appears that North 
Korea decided to develop nuclear weapons based on national strategy and foreign policy, 
where nuclear weapons were to serve as a deterrent and as leverage for negotiations. 
Another variable that appears to have been influencing North Korea to make this choice 
is the failure of the Six-Party talks in 2005. It is the assessment of this research that the 
behaviour of North Korea can be described through realism, all the way. 
 
Libya’s decision to cancel its nuclear programme appears to have been strongly 
influenced by the work of sanctions, while the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network, the 
Lockerbie negotiations; the understanding that the United States did not want regime 
change; and the chance of increased security also affected the Libyan nuclear 
programme. Libya’s nuclear reversal could best be described through realism, while 
liberalism might explain some parts of the negotiations.  Finally, a question worth asking 
is: Would it be possible for North Korea or Iran to conduct a nuclear rollback like Libya 
did, in the future? The answer is maybe, but that would require a more transparent policy 
from Washington D.C. because it is presently impossible for the two states to know what 
will happen if they give up their programmes. Will the United States then cancel the 
sanctions, or will it demand regime change and improved human rights? 
 
  
  
 
 88   
 
7 Litterature 
 
Arms Control Association. (2013a). Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations 
with the United States, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology ,updated 
September 2013, downloaded 15 January 2012.  
 
Arms Control Association. (2013b). History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear 
Issue http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals ,updated October 
2013, downloaded 15 January 2013. 
 
Arms Control Association. (2013c). Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and 
Missile Diplomacy, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron , updated April 
2013, downloaded 15 March 2013.  
 
Arms Control Association. (2003). Iran proposal. Retrieved from 
http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf 
 
Art, Robert J. (2009). America’s Grand Strategy and world politics. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Barnett, Michael. (2011). Social Constructivism. In Baylis, John, Smith, Steve & Owens, 
Patricia, The Globalization of World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Baylies, John. (2011). International and global security. In Baylis, John, Smith, Steve & 
Owens, Patricia, The Globalization of World Politics. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Baylis, John, Smith, Steve & Owens, Patricia. (2011). The Globalization of World 
Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bluth, Christoph. (2012). The Irrelevance of “Trusting Relationships”. In the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Reconsidering the Dynamics of Proliferation. The British 
Journal of Political and International Relations, Vol.14, pp.115-130. 
 
 
  
  
 
 89   
 
Breivik, Hanne & Toft, Kristine. (2007). The A.Q. Khan network. FFI-rapport 
2007/00535. Kjeller: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt. 
 
Bolton, John R. (2002). Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of 
Mass Destruction. Speech held at the Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from 
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/beyond-the-axis-of-evil 
 
Bowen, Wyn. (2008). Libya. In Doyle, James E, Nuclear safeguards, Security and 
Nonproliferation. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Braut-Hegghammer, Målfrid. (2009). Libya’s Nuclear Intentions: Ambition and 
Ambivalence. Center for Contemporary Conflict. Retrieved from 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/25636/1/Libya%20-
%20Nuclear%20intentions.pdf?1 
 
Braut-Hegghammer, Målfrid. (2008). Libya’s Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from 
Tripoli. Middle East Journal, Vol.62(1). 
 
Bush, George W. (2002, 29 January). State of the Union Address. Retrieved from 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128-13.html 
 
Carolyn, James C. (2000). Iran and Iraq as rational crisis actors: Dangers and dynamics of 
survivable Nuclear War. Journal of Strategic Studies, 23(1), pp.52-73. 
 
Cha, Victor D. & Kang, David C. (2004). The Debate over North Korea. Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 119 (2), pp. 229-254. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998). The constructivist turn in international relations. In World 
Politics Vol.50 (2). 
 
Cox, Michael. (2011). From the Cold War to the world economic crisis in Baylis, John, 
Smith, Steve & Owens, Patricia, The Globalization of World Politics. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
 
  
  
 
 90   
 
Dahl, Fredrik. (2013, 18 June). North Korea nuclear test still shrouded in mystery. 
Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/18/us-nuclear-
northkorea-test-idUSBRE95H0WN20130618 
 
Dunne, Tim & Schmidt, Brian C. (2011). Realism in Baylis, John, Smith, Steve & 
Patricia, The Globalization of World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Heldal, Aslak & Schultz Heireng, Hege. (2013). Hassan Rouhani og atomforhandlingene 
med Iran. Nytt håp, men tøffe realiteter. Unpublished manuscript. Kjeller: Forsvarets 
Forskningsinstitutt. 
 
Hellevik, Ottar. (2002). Forskningsmetode i Sosiologi og Statsvitenskap. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Henderson, Simon & Heinonen, Olli (2012). Nuclear IraN – A Glossary of Terms. The 
Washington Institute. Retrieved from 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus121NuclearGlo
ssary2.pdf 
 
Høibråten, Steinar, Breivik Hanne, Enger, Elin, Heireng, Hege Schultz & Kippe, Halvor. 
(2013). Atomprogrammene i India, Pakistan, Nord-Korea, Israel, Iran og Syria. FFI-
rapport 2011/01603. Kjeller: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt. 
 
IAEA. (2013a). About the IAEA. Geneva: International Atomic Energy Agency.  
Retrieved from http://www.iaea.org/About/about-iaea.html 
 
IAEA. (2013b). What We Do. Geneva: International Atomic Energy Agency.  Retrieved 
from http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/what.html 
 
IAEA. (2013c). Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and 
Additional Protocols. Geneva: International Atomic Energy Agency.  Retrieved from 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html. 
 
 
  
  
 
 91   
 
IAEA. (2011).Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement 
and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Geneva: International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved from 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf   
 
IAEA. (2006). Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. -Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006. Geneva: 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved from 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf. 
 
IAEA. (2004). Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. –Resolution adopted by the Board on 18 June 2004. 
Geneva: International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved from 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-49.pdf 
 
IAEA. (2003). Board of Governors: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. - Resolution adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003. 
Geneva: International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved from 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf 
 
IAEA. (1970, 22 April). Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Geneva: 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved from 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf 
 
Indyk, Martin. (2004). The Iraq War did not Force Gaddaffi’s Hand. Washingdon D.C.: 
Brookings Institution. Retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2004/03/09middleeast-indyk 
 
ISIS. (2008). Briefing notes from February 2008 IAEA meeting regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program. 11 April 2008. Institute for Science and International Security. Retrieved from  
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Briefing_Weaponization.pdf. 
 
Jacobsen, Dag. Ingvar. (2000). Hvordan gjennomføre undersøkelser? Innføring i 
samfunnsvitenskapelig metode. Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget. 
 
  
  
 
 92   
 
 
Kippe, Halvor. (2009). Irans kjernefysiske program –for kraftproduksjon eller 
kjernevåpen? FFI-rapport 2009/00083. Kjeller: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt. 
 
Kippe, Halvor. (2003). Nord-Koreas kjernevåpenprogram. FFI-rapport 2003/00942. 
Kjeller: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt. 
 
KCNA. (2011, 22 March). Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces US Military Attack 
on Libya. Korean Central News Agency. Retrieved from 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201103/news22/20110322-34ee.html 
 
KCNA. (2003, 10 January). Statement of DPRK Government on its withdrawal from 
NPT. Korean Central News Agency. Retrived from 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/news01/11.htm 
 
KCNA. (2002, 25 October). Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S 
called for. Korean Central News Agency. Retrived from 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm 
 
Lamy, Steven L. Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism, 
in Baylis, John, Smith, Steve & Owens, Patricia, The Globalization of World Politics. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Landsberg, Carel Martin. (2009).  An analysis of Iranian Negotiating style as Evidenced  
from the 1979 US Hostage Crisis and the Iran-EU Nuclear Negotiations from 2003 to 
2006 (Master in International Relations). University of Pretoria, Pretoria. 
 
Legro, Jeffrey W., Moravscik, Andrew. (1999). Is anybody still a realist? In International 
Security, Vol.24 (2), pp. 5–55. Retrieved from 
http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/anybody.pdf 
 
Lijphart,  A.(1975). The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research in 
Comparative Political Studies, 8, pp.169-181. 
 
 
  
  
 
 93   
 
Lodgaard, Sverre. (2013). Hva skjer I Nord-Korea? Asiatisk stabilitet i fare? Paper 
presented at «Nord-Korea, -en trussel?» Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Oslo. 
 
Lodgaard, Sverre. (2012). Nuclear Diplomacy: the Case of Iran in Rieker, Pernille & 
Sending Ole Jacob, Inter-cultural dialogue in international crises. NUPI-report. Oslo: 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Lodgaard, Sverre. (2011). Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation –Towards a 
nuclear-weapon-free world? New York: Routhledge. 
 
Mayer, Mayer. (2013). Theorizing Mass Destruction: Explaining the Role of Nuclear 
Weapons. (PhD, Institutt for Forsvarsstudier), Det Samfunnsvitenskapelige Fakultet, 
Universitetet Oslo: Oslo.  
 
Method. (2013) In Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved from 
 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/method 
 
Mousavian, Sayeed Houssain. (2012). The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A memoir. 
Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
 
Mærli, Morten Bremer. (2009). Atomvåpen: Det du ikke vet, det du ikke vil vite. Oslo: 
Pax forlag. 
 
Nackaerts Herman. (2011, 18 July). IAEA Safeguards: Cooperation as the key to change. 
Paper presented at the 52nd annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management, 18 July 2011, Palm Desert, California, United States. Retrieved from   
http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/statements-repository/Key_to_Change.pdf 
 
NIE. (2007). Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. National Intelligence Estimate 
Retrieved from 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_rele
ase.pdf. 
 
 
  
  
 
 94   
 
Nikitin, Mary Beth. (2012, 15 June). Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. Retrieved from 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34327.pdf 
 
O’Niel, Andrew. (2008).  Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia:  
redundant or resurgent? Chatham House. Retrieved from 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2011/87
_6oneill.pdf 
 
Powell, Collin. (2003, 5 February). U.S Secretary of States Adress to the United Nations 
Security Council. Retrieved from  http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html 
 
Petersson, Torbjörn. (2013, 15 April). Han har en stor plan for landet. Aftenposten. 
 
Pollack, Jonathan D.(2011). No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International 
Security. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Record, Jeffrey. (2004). Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation., 
Policy Analysis No.519, CATO Institute. Retrieved from 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa519.pdf 
 
Rieker, Pernille & Braut-Hegghammer, Målfrid. (2012). The Libya conflict(s) and the 
role of multicultural dialogue in Rieker, Pernille & Sending Ole Jacob, Inter-cultural 
dialogue in international crises.  NUPI-report. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs. 
 
Ringdal, Kristen. (2007). Enhet og mangfold. 2nd edition. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
 
Rogue State. (2013) In Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved from 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/rogue-state 
 
Roth, Ariel Ilan. (2007). Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory, in International 
Studies Review (9), pp. 369-384. 
 
  
  
 
 95   
 
 
Sagan, Scott. D (2010). Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation, in Potter, William C. 
& Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar, Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in 21st Century –The role 
of theory. Volume 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press 
 
Sagan, Scott. D. (1996-1997). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in 
Search of a Bomb, in International Security, Vol. 21 (3), pp. 54-86. 
 
Sagan, Scott D. & Waltz, Kenneth. (1995). The spread of nuclear weapons: A debate. 
New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Sanger, David E. (2004). The Khan Network. Retrieved from http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/evnts/3889/Khan_network-paper.pdf 
 
Shamir, Shira. (2013). Libya’s Nuclear Rollback: The Role of Oil Dependence. Sigma 
Iota Rho – Journal of International Relations. Retrieved from 
http://www.sirjournal.org/2013/03/23/libyas-nuclear-rollback-the-role-of-oil-dependence/ 
 
Sherrill, Clifton W. (2012). Why Iran wants the bomb and what it means for US policy, 
in Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 19 (1). 
 
Tjora, Aksel. (2010). Kvalitative forskningsmetoder i praksis. Oslo: Gyldendal 
Akademisk. 
 
Toft, Heidi Kristine. (2004). Pakistan’s kjernevåpenprogram. FFI-rapport 2004/00113. 
Kjeller: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt. 
 
UNODA.(2013). Disarmament Issues. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 
Retrieved from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/Issues/ 
 
Wastnidge, Edward. (2011). Détente and Dialogue: Iran and the OIC during the Khatami 
Era (1997-2005). Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol.12 (4), p. 413-431. Retrieved from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21567689.2011.624411 
 
 
  
  
 
 96   
 
Østerud, Øyvind. (2007). Statsvitenskap – innføring i politisk analyse, 4th.edition. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 97   
 
 Nuclear Weapon Development Appendix A
Nuclear technologies are used worldwide for peaceful purposes such as generating 
electricity, diagnosing disease, treating cancer, for numerous industrial applications, and 
for food and medical sterilization. As more and more states implement nuclear 
technologies, it is important that the IAEA verifies NPT compliance in all non-nuclear-
weapon states using its mandate from NPT’s Article III (see section 8). This is a 
challenge for the IAEA, as much nuclear technology has a dual-use aspect, where actors 
with the necessary know-how could turn a civil programme into a nuclear weapons 
programme. Especially the implementation of fuel cycle technology opens up for a 
nuclear weapons option, as will be shown in this section. In order to understand why the 
IAEA should be concerned when states like Iran, Libya and North Korea expand their 
nuclear infrastructure (allegedly for civil purposes), it is necessary to understand the key 
factors of a nuclear weapons programme, and what steps need to be taken by an actor 
who wants to develop nuclear weapons. This section will provide a very basic 
introduction to nuclear weapons development.  
A.1 Fissile Material 
A nuclear explosion gets its explosive yield when energy is released through either fission 
or fusion. In fission, a heavy nucleus is split by an incident neutron, typically into two 
daughter nuclei, leading to the release of energy as well as two to four neutrons, each 
capable of splitting another nucleus and thereby create a chain reaction. In a nuclear 
explosion, it is essential to achieve a chain reaction with a large number of fission 
processes (typically between 1024 and 1025) releasing energy. In fusion (see Figure 1), 
light nuclei (hydrogen isotopes28) are merged together, releasing energy. The discussion 
in this research will focus on fission weapons, as nuclear fusion is far more advanced 
technically and therefore not expected to be implemented in the countries covered here.  
 
                                                          
28 Isotopes are variants of the same element (uranium, for example), but with a different number of neutrons 
in the nucleus. The chemical properties are the same for all isotopes of a given element, but the nuclear 
properties vary. The number used to characterise each isotope (such as “235” in “uranium-235”) indicates 
the total number of nuclear particles (neutrons and protons) in the nucleus. 
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Figure 1: A simple representation of an explosive chain reaction (Breivik 2008). 
 
The most basic element in a nuclear programme, whether it is civilian or military, is the 
fissile material. A fissile material is a material consisting of atomic nuclei that may be 
split by neutrons of all energies, enabling it to sustain a rapid chain reaction providing 
energy for a nuclear explosion. As fissile material, the isotopes uranium-235 (U-235) and 
plutonium-239 (Pu-239) are the most common and useful. The acquisition of either one 
of these two isotopes is regarded as the most complex process in the development of 
nuclear weapons, and the actor will have to build vast and sophisticated (and expensive) 
facilities for the production, as will be explained below. 
 
Both materials have its origin from natural uranium found in the earth’s crust. Either 
imported or produced in domestic uranium mines, the raw material is sent to a “uranium 
mill” to separate the waste from the product. The result is uranium concentrate (U3O8), 
often referred to as “yellowcake”, consisting of less than 0.7 % of the wanted U-235. The 
further process is known as the “uranium path” or the “plutonium path” depending on the 
desired outcome. Historically, different states have chosen different paths depending on 
their national preferences.  
A.1.1 The Uranium Path 
Containing only 0.7 % of the fissile isotope U-235, the rest being the non-fissile uranium 
isotope U-238, natural uranium must be enriched in U-235 for use in nuclear weapons 
(and for use as fuel in most nuclear reactors as well). Separating the two isotopes is no 
simple process, but amongst the 6-7 known methods, gas centrifuges and gas diffusion 
are the most applied. Uranium enriched to over 90 % of U-235 is commonly referred to 
as weapons-grade uranium. Uranium enriched to 20 % U-235 or more is generally 
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known as highly enriched uranium (HEU), and less than 20 % is known as low enriched 
uranium (LEU). It is worth noticing that LEU is used in most nuclear power plants, with 
uranium enriched to a 3-5 % level.  
 
What is Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6)? 
The gaseous feedstock used in the uranium enrichment process that produces fuel for 
nuclear reactors and weapons.  
A.1.2 The Plutonium Path 
As uranium fuel is being burned in any nuclear reactor, a number of plutonium isotopes 
will be produced in the fuel. Natural uranium may be used as fuel in specially designed 
reactors (either civil or military). This is the optimal fuel for producing Pu-239, which is 
the wanted plutonium isotope for use in nuclear weapons, and as the spent fuel is 
recycled in a reprocessing facility, Pu-239 is extracted (mixed with other plutonium 
isotopes that may be present). The shorter time the fuel spends in the reactor, the better 
weapons grade plutonium it is possible to produce (that is, the higher the content of Pu-
239 relative to other plutonium isotopes), but the total amount of plutonium will 
necessarily be correspondingly small. Thus a military reactor will have to change fuel 
more often than a civilian reactor. It is customary to assume that weapons-grade 
plutonium contains more than 90 % Pu-239. The advantage of the plutonium path is that 
an enrichment facility is not needed to produce the weapons-grade fissile material, but the 
required nuclear reactor and reprocessing facility are also quite complex and expensive.  
A.2 Weapons Design 
As mentioned earlier, nuclear fission weapons are the focus of this research, thus only the 
design of fission weapons is discussed below. 
 
The fundamental goal of a nuclear weapon is to rapidly release a large amount of energy 
at a given place and time. And in order to do so, the following four challenges must be 
met: 
 
1. Keeping the fissile material in a subcritical condition before the detonation 
2. Taking the fissile material from a subcritical to a supercritical condition. 
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3. Introducing neutrons into the critical mass as it reaches its optimal supercriticality 
in a small fraction of a second. 
4. Keeping the mass together as long as possible during the expansion in order to 
gain as much energy as possible before the mass self-destructs and becomes 
subcritical again.  
 
 
What is Criticality? 
Criticality is defined as the condition where a fissile material is able to undergo a 
sustained chain reaction.  A chain reaction is exactly critical if one fission leads to 
exactly one new fission. The mass is supercritical if one fission leads to more than one 
new fission, creating an exponential growth. The steeper the exponential growth, the 
more effective the bomb will be.  A mass is subcritical if the material does not have the 
ability to sustain a chain reaction. 
 
In a fission-based weapons programme, there are two types of design: The gun-type 
design where one piece of weapons-grade uranium is fired through a “gun barrel” to 
merge with another piece of weapons-grade uranium, creating a supercritical mass and 
thus making the desirable chain reaction possible. For this type of design only uranium 
can be used29. The implosion-type design is based on the compression of a sphere of 
subcritical material (either uranium or plutonium) to a higher density where the required 
critical mass is smaller by detonating conventional explosives very precisely over the 
entire surface. An advantage of the implosion design is the possibility to reduce the size 
of the bomb, as the design requires less fissile material. This is due to the fact that the 
implosion shortens the distance which the neutrons have to travel in order to sustain the 
chain reaction, hence enabling both a smaller mass and a faster exponential growth. 
  
The gun-type design is considered the easiest way to construct a bomb, and it was used in 
“Little Boy” which was dropped over Hiroshima in Japan 6 August 1945. However, one 
                                                          
29 This is because the collision is too slow for plutonium’s high rate of spontaneous fission, which may set 
off the chain reaction before the material reaches its optimal supercriticality, almost ensuring pre-
detonation and failure. 
 
  
  
 
 101   
 
assumes that today’s nuclear-weapon states generally prefer the implosion design for the 
following reasons:  
 
1. It permits the use of plutonium, which has a significantly smaller critical mass 
than uranium, enabling a more compact weapon. 
2. It is easier to achieve a higher explosive yield. 
3. The design requires less fissile material because a nuclear implosion weapon only 
needs as little as maybe ¼ of its uncompressed critical mass because the 
implosion will increase the density and thereby significantly reduce the amount of 
fissile material required for criticality, whereas a gun-type weapon needs more 
than one critical mass in total for its two separate parts. 
 
Detailed information regarding the amount of fissile material needed for a nuclear 
weapon is limited by a high degree of confidentiality. It varies depending on the design 
and desired explosive force combined with the skills of the producer. Aspiring nuclear-
weapon states naturally lack experience and thus will likely use more fissile material for 
each bomb compared to an established nuclear-weapon state. 
A.3 Means of Delivery 
The difference between a nuclear weapon and a nuclear explosive device is important, as 
the term “weapon” indicates that it is fully operational in the sense of being deployable, 
and subsequently delivered on target. In order to have an operational nuclear weapon, the 
nuclear warhead must be implemented into an available delivery system. Typical delivery 
systems are missiles, airplanes, ships, submarines and even artillery shells (Toft 2004). 
 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Appendix B
Weapons (NPT)  
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty, 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and 
the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take 
measures to safeguard the security of peoples, 
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Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger 
of nuclear war, 
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the 
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, 
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, 
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the 
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special 
fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic 
points, 
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, 
including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States 
from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful 
purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon 
States, 
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute 
alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament, 
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective, 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear 
weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to 
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to 
continue negotiations to this end, 
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Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust 
between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, 
the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals 
of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of 
international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for 
armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, 
Have agreed as follows: 
B.1 Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, 
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices. 
B.2 Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer 
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or 
of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices. 
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B.3 Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as 
set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of 
the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be 
followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being 
produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such 
facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special 
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, 
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.  
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be 
subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to 
comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or 
technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of 
peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and 
equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes 
in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set 
forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either 
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence 
within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing 
their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such 
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agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall 
enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. 
B.4 Article IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this 
Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, 
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to 
do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or 
international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the 
world. 
B.5 Article V 
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in 
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through 
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive 
devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and 
development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such 
benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an 
appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon 
States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty 
enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also 
obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
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B.6 Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control. 
B.7 Article VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties 
in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. 
B.8 Article VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any 
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall 
circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or 
more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a 
conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an 
amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the 
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty 
and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the 
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall 
enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the 
amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the 
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members 
of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it 
shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification 
of the amendment. 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty 
shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with 
a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are 
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being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty 
may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the 
convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of 
the Treaty. 
B.9 Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the 
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may 
accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of 
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of 
which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this 
Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, 
a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or 
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to 
the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of 
their instruments of ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States 
of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of 
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any 
requests for convening a conference or other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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B.10 Article X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from 
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council 
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary 
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be 
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a 
majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1 
B.11 Article XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly 
certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the 
Governments of the signatory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of 
July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight. 
 
 
